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ABSTRACT 
 
The Effect of Changes in Maternity Leave Policy on Labor Market Outcomes for 
Females in Brazil 
By 
 
VIVIANE MARIA BASTOS DE MALAFIA 
 
December, 2008 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Erdal Tekin 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
Maternity leave policy has changed a few times over the last 20 years in Brazil. 
This paper investigates how a ceiling imposed on the maternity leave benefit paid by 
Brazilian Social Security in Dec, 1998 and its temporarily suspension in May, 1999 
affected females‘ employment and earnings using difference-in-difference method. 
We apply the difference-in-difference method to examine whether the changes in 
maternity leave policy negatively affected females in the labor market. Our analysis uses 
four treatment groups: 1) young females, aged 20 to 40 years, 2) young females working 
in the private sector, 3) older females, aged 41 to 65 years, working in the private sector, 
and 4) young females with infants. Young females were selected based on the fact that 
they have a higher probability of giving birth compared to older females and, 
consequently, using the maternity leave benefit. The second and third groups were 
supposedly the groups directly reached by these changes in maternity leave policy since 
earnings and employment in the public sector should not be based on an individual‘s 
gender and therefore discrimination may be absent or less prevalent there than in the 
 xvi 
 
private sector. We also include young females with infants as a treatment group since 
employers may use this information to infer the probability of a female having another 
child. We also propose four control groups: 1) older females aged between 41 and 65 
years, 2) young females working in the public sector, 3) older females working in the 
public sector, and 4) young males. 
Overall, our results show that the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits paid 
by Social Security and the transfer of the responsibility of paying the remaining wages to 
employers negatively affected females‘ hourly wages, and this negative effect seems to 
have persisted even while the limit was temporarily suspended. Furthermore, young 
females were more affected by the change in policy than older females. These results lead 
us to think that these changes in maternity leave policy may have slowed the convergence 
of females‘ wages toward males‘ wages or ―forced‖ females to swim upstream during the 
period from May 1999 to March 2003. 
 
1 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 1998, the Social Security System (INSS) reform was sanctioned by 
Brazil‘s Congress, imposing a ceiling of R$ 1,2001 on every benefit  including maternity 
leave for working women, paid by paid by the INSS.
2
 Consequently, employers became 
responsible for paying the remaining wages to women earning wages above this ceiling. 
For instance, if a woman earns R$ 1,500, Social Security will pay R$ 1,200 and her 
employer pays R$ 300. According to traditional labor demand/supply theory, this change 
in maternity leave policy is expected to decrease demand for female workers because it 
would increase costs to their employers. 
One month after the Congress‘s action, in January 1999, a lawsuit was filed at the 
Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Court) arguing that this ceiling was unconstitutional 
since it may increase discrimination against women in the labor market. In May 1999, the 
Supremo temporarily suspended this limit on the maternity leave benefit. The limit was 
permanently cancelled in March 2003, about four years later. 
The period from December 1998 to March 2003 allows analysis of females‘ labor 
market outcomes from the perspective of two different policy changes. From December 
1998 to May 1999, the effects of the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits paid by 
the INSS on females‘ employment and earnings can be analyzed. The temporary 
suspension of this ceiling also permits the examination of whether employment and 
earnings of females were negatively affected from May 1999 through March 2003 
                                                 
 
1
 US$ 1.00 = R$1.58 on 07/26/2008;  US$ 1.00 = R$1.21 in December 1998. Source: Brazilian Central 
Bank,www.bcb.gov.br/, retrieved on 07/25/08. 
2
 Amendment nº 20 (artº 14) was included in the Constitution. 
2 
 
2 
 
because employers were uncertain about the Supremo‘s final decision even though 
maternity leave benefits had returned to being fully paid by Social Security. In addition, 
whether the demand for female workers increased after the limit on maternity benefits 
paid by the INSS was finally cancelled in March 2003 can be also examined. 
These policy changes overlap with a period of time when female labor force 
participation was growing for each age cohort (see Figure 1). This rise in females‘ 
engagement in the labor market may have promoted not only an increase in females‘ 
productivity but also a reduction of gender discrimination. 
Figure 1.  Female labor force participation by age cohort and years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hoffman and Leone (2004), p. 41. 
 
Studying the effects of the changes in maternity leave policy from December 
1998 to March 2003 is important considering that discrimination is the main source of the 
gender wage gap in Brazil. Indeed, differences in productivity in Brazil do not play as 
important a role in Brazil as they do in the United States in explaining gender wage 
differentials (Barros, Ramos, & Santos, 1995; Leme & Wajnman, 2000). 
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At the time of this research, most of the studies that analyzed changes in 
maternity leave policy focused on an introduction of unpaid or paid maternity leave 
and/or a change in the duration of the leave. This is the first study to verify the effects of 
changes in maternity leave policy on females‘ hourly wages and employment outcomes 
using microdata from a Latin American country. Besides the evident interest in 
examining whether the main stylized facts hold for a Latin American country, the 
motivation also lies in the fact that these changes in the maternity leave policy in Brazil 
allow the examination of the effects in cases where there was a direct increase in the costs 
to employers but no additional benefit conceded to working women. In contrast to the 
many studies that analyzed the effects of changes in maternity leave policy on females‘ 
outcomes, this study introduces females working in the public sector as a control group 
for females working in the private sector under the assumption that the changes in policy 
did not affect females who work in the public sector. 
We apply the difference-in-difference method to examine whether the changes in 
maternity leave policy negatively affected females in the labor market. Our analysis uses 
four treatment groups: 1) young females, aged 20 to 40 years, 2) young females working 
in the private sector, 3) older females, aged 41 to 65 years, working in the private sector, 
and 4) young females with infants. Young females were selected based on the fact that 
they have a higher probability of giving birth compared to older females and, 
consequently, using the maternity leave benefit. The second and third groups were 
supposedly the groups directly reached by these changes in maternity leave policy since 
earnings and employment in the public sector should not be based on an individual‘s 
gender and therefore discrimination may be absent or less prevalent there than in the 
4 
 
4 
 
private sector. We also include young females with infants as a treatment group since 
employers may use this information to infer the probability of a female having another 
child. We also propose four control groups: 1) older females aged between 41 and 65 
years, 2) young females working in the public sector, 3) older females working in the 
public sector, and 4) young males. 
This dissertation uses two different household surveys: the Pesquisa Mensal de 
Emprego (PME) from 1996 to 2006 (with the year 2001 excluded) and the Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio (PNAD) from 1996 to 2002 (with the year 2000 
excluded).
3
 Both surveys are conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística.
4
 The main difference between the two datasets is that the PME is conducted 
monthly in the six biggest cities in Brazil—São Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Belo 
Horizonte (BH), Salvador (SA), Recife (RE), and Porto Alegre (POA)—while the PNAD 
is conducted annually, except during Census year, in every of the 27 states in Brazil. 
Only the PNAD is constructed using a representative sample of the population in Brazil. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 present the literature 
review and the theoretical framework, respectively. Chapter 4 introduces the empirical 
model. Chapter 5 discusses both datasets and introduces the variables used in the 
analyses. The construction of analyses samples is also discussed in chapter 5. Finally, 
chapter 6 summarizes the results and concludes the report. Descriptive statistics and full 
regression tables are presented in Appendices A, B, and C. 
                                                 
 
3
 The PNAD survey was not conducted in 2000 because the CENSUS was performed that year instead. 
4
 Available at www.ibge.gov.br/english/ retrieved on November 25, 2008. 
5 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Maternity Leave Policy 
Maternity Leave Law gives women the right to leave their job for a certain period 
of time and to return to the same job position. During maternity leave, women may or 
may not be remunerated; whether their maternity leave is paid or unpaid depends on what 
is established by the federal, state, and/or firm‘s statute mandate. For example, the federal 
law in the U.S. (Family and Medical Leave Act [FMLA], 1993) states that a female 
worker has a right to four months of unpaid leave. Ruhm (1998) stated that all Western 
European countries mandate at least three months of paid maternity leave, however.  
In 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) established the right to 
twelve weeks of unpaid maternity leave for eligible women in the United States.
5
 
However, some states in the US had already passed maternity leave laws. Taking 
advantage of the fact that maternity leave laws were passed in some states earlier than the 
FMLA was passed, Baum (2003) used the difference-in-difference method to examine 
whether the FMLA had an effect on employment and wages for mothers with infants and 
women at childbearing age in the states with no prior maternity leave policy. Baum‘s 
paper used three different control groups: individuals from states where maternity leave 
legislation was passed since 1993, men, and single men from states with no mandated 
maternity leave before FMLA. After controlling for demographic characteristics, state-
specific effects, and year-specific effects, Baum found that maternity leave legislation 
                                                 
 
5
 The FMLA states that a woman is eligible for maternity leave if she has worked at least one year and if 
she has worked at least 1,250 hours during the last year in her current job. In addition, this law is only 
applicable to those female employees who work in large firms (firms with at least 50 employees). 
 
6 
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increased the probability of women being employed. Moreover, Baum found that 
mandated maternity leave had a negative impact on the wages of mothers with infants 
and a positive effect on the wages of women of childbearing age. However, these results 
are not statistically significant. Since the new legislation had an impact on the female 
labor supply as well, the coefficients might be biased as a result of self-selection. Because 
of this, the author used a correction method proposed by Heckman (1979). After 
correcting for self-selection, Baum found that the new legislation had a small but not a 
significant effect on female wages. According to Baum, small effects on female wages 
and employment are reasonable for two reasons. First, maternity benefits were unpaid. 
Second, most employers were already providing maternity leave benefits before FMLA 
was passed. 
The maternity leave policy has been present in Europe since the German Imperial 
Industrial Code of 1891 established that women were forbidden to work during the first 
four weeks after childbirth (Ruhm, 1998). During the following one hundred years, 
benefits were continuously extended and now a paid parental leave of at least 12 weeks is 
provided across all Western European countries. According to Ruhm (1998), the parent 
benefit covers not less than 80% of their current earnings, and it is usually provided by 
the government. In some countries, the legislation also permits the parents (mother and 
father) to decide which of them will take the leave. Using men and women aged 45 to 54 
years as a control group for women aged 25 to 34 years (the treatment group), Ruhm 
(1998) analyzed how changes in maternity leave legislation from 1969 to 1993 affected 
women‘s employment and wages in 16 European countries. The results show that 
7 
 
7 
 
changes in paid maternity benefit have a negative effect on female wages but increased 
women‘s employment. 
In order to verify whether women value maternity leave as a benefit (an amenity 
of the job), Edwards (2006) estimated the wage differential between those women who 
are eligible for maternity leave and those women who are ineligible in Australia. A 
negative relationship between wage differential and eligibility for maternity leave was 
found. In other words, women who are eligible for maternity leave receive, on average, 
lower wages than those who are not eligible. 
Maternity policy and its effects are not largely studied in Brazil and Latin 
America. The only study that we are aware of, at the time of this literature review, was 
conducted by Carvalho, Firpo and Gonzaga (2006). Using a difference-in-difference 
method, they examined whether the increase in maternity leave duration from 84 days to 
120 days in 1988 led to a reduction in women‘s wages, seniority at their current job, and 
employment in the labor market. Men between 20 and 35 years old and women between 
35 and 65 years old were the control groups to women between 20 and 35 years old.
6
 
Their results showed that an increase of approximately one month in the duration of the 
leave does not appear to have an effect on young females‘ wages, or employment in the 
labor market. 
Gruber (1994) studied the effect of mandated coverage for childbirth in health 
insurance policies established in 1978 in the United States. The interesting fact in this 
                                                 
 
6
 They assume that women between 20 and 35 years old are in a fertile group and, therefore, are more likely 
to be affected by the increase in the duration of the maternity leave. Although the researchers do not 
explicitly explain this, they consider women older than 35 years to have a low probability of getting 
pregnant; therefore, these women are probably not affected by this change in policy. 
8 
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study is that the mandate affected not only women but also married men. Gruber 
estimated the impact of the inclusion of childbirth in health insurance on young women 
and young married men‘s wages, employment, and hours of work using single men and 
men and women over 40 years old as control groups. Their results showed that both 
married young men and young women were negatively affected by the mandate. 
Nevertheless, the labor market response was greater for young women (single and 
married) than for young married men.  
Gender Wage Gap 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the female-male wage ratio did not improve 
substantially and remained around 60% in the U.S. (Blau and Kahn, 1980). A change in 
this pattern occurred at the end of the 1970s, causing the gender wage gap to narrow. The 
study of what factors contributed to this decline in the gender wage gap was important 
since wage inequality had increased considerably for both men and women and net shifts 
of supply and demand were disadvantageous for women overall during the 1980s. 
Blau and Kahn (1997) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1980 
and 1989 to decompose the changes in the gender wage gap in the U.S. applying the 
methodology proposed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP) (1991). According to their 
results, the increase in wage inequality was responsible for slowing down the decline in 
the gender wage gap. However, improvement in female skills (e.g., years of schooling 
and experience) and reduction in discrimination against women were large enough to 
make up for the negative effect of the increase in wage inequality and, consequently, 
sufficient to promote a decline in the gender wage gap over this period. 
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Contrary to the 1980s, the 1990s saw a slower convergence in the U.S. gender 
wage gap. Blau and Kahn (2006) also studied which factors led to a slower convergence 
of female and male wages in the 1990s using JMP methodology to decompose the 
sources of changes in the gender wage gap. According to their results, the slower rate in 
the convergence was mainly caused by changes in labor force selectivity (e.g., changes in 
female labor force participation were lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s), changes in 
female and male unmeasured characteristics (e.g., reduction of gender discrimination was 
slower in the 1990s), and changes in the demand shifts and wage inequality. On the other 
hand, improvements in females‘ experience, education, and commitment in the labor 
market were not the reasons for the reduction in the female-male wage ratio growth to the 
extent that changes in human capital compared to men were similar to the previous 
period‘s improvements. Finally, changes in occupations and deunionization benefited 
women less in the 1990s than in the 1980s. 
Blau and Kahn (2003) analyzed whether wage structures were strongly related to 
the size of the gender wage gap using a microdata survey of 22 industrialized countries.
7
 
They found that higher wage inequality contributes to a low female-male wage ratio since 
return to skills is high (e.g., experience and education), which usually harms more female 
workers than male workers. Additionally, they showed that a high excess of female 
supply reduces the gender wage gap. 
Camargo and Serrano‘s report (1983) is one of the first papers to study gender 
differentials in the labor market in Brazil. Using a survey collected by the Brazilian 
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 The 22 countries studied were Australia, Austria, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, East 
Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
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Ministry of Labor (Relação Annual de Informações Sociais [RAIS]) in 1976, they 
estimated a wage equation for each gender in order to test whether their wage 
determination has a different structure. Their results indicate that males and females‘ 
wages have different processes of determination. In addition, they concluded that men‘s 
wages are mostly affected by labor market structure (e.g., size of firm, capital intensity 
level, industry concentration level), whereas education is the main variable in the 
determination of females‘ wages. 
Leme and Wajnman (2000) examined changes in the gender wage gap in Brazil 
between two cohorts, 1952 and 1962. They applied the Oaxaca decomposition 
methodology to Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra à Domicilio (PNAD) microdata for 1977 
through 1997. In the first cohort, women earned 38% less than men, on average, in spite 
of the fact that the females had 1.5 more years of schooling than the males on average. In 
the next cohort, the gender wage gap had narrowed by 17% while the schooling gap did 
not change. According to their results, most of this decrease in gender wage differentials 
was a result of a reduction in discrimination against women in the labor market. They 
also showed that females who live outside the Southeast, working in any other sector than 
the agricultural and/or informal sectors, are more penalized by discrimination.
8
 
In order to verify whether wage differentials differ across formal and informal 
sectors in Brazil, Kassouf (1998) estimated female and male wage equations for both 
sectors using PNAD data for 1989.
9
 The results indicated that gender discrimination was 
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 The Southeast region includes São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Espírito Santo. It is the richer 
and more populated region of Brazil. 
9
 A polychotomous choice model was applied to correct for selection bias where individuals faced three 
different choices: not employed, employed in the formal sector, and employed in the informal sector. 
11 
 
11 
 
present in both sectors (formal and informal) but that discrimination against women is 
higher in the informal sector. 
Baptista (2000) studied gender wage differentials in the Brazilian labor market 
using PNAD microdata for 1996. The findings are similar to previous studies regarding 
the size and existence of gender discrimination in Brazil. However, the fact that this study 
uses samples of married men, married women, single men, and single women allowed 
comparison of the gender wage gap for married and single individuals separately. 
According to the results presented, it seems that married females are penalized more in 
the labor market than single females. 
The end of the 1980s and the 1990s was marked by macroeconomics changes 
(positive and negative) and trade and financial reforms that resulted in a huge openness of 
the Brazilian economy. For these reasons, Arabsheibani, Carneiro, and Henley (2003) 
analyzed whether changes in the Brazilian economy were also responsible for the 
narrowing of the gender wage gap in Brazil over the period of 1988 to 1998. Using 
PNAD microdata from 1988 to 1998, they decomposed the decrease in the gender wage 
gap into changes in gender-specific characteristics, changes in observed prices, changes 
in men and women‘s wage positions, and changes in unobserved prices using Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce (1991) methodology. Their results showed that the decrease in 
gender discrimination was the main force behind the decline of the gender wage gap 
during this period. Moreover, they pointed out that changes in wage dispersion, relative 
improvements on human capital, and an increase in skills‘ prices contributed to a great 
female-male wage ratio, although in a smaller scale than changes in gender 
discrimination. 
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Our study contributes to the literature in three points. First, the  changes in 
maternity leave policy in Brazil allow us to study how females‘ labor market outcomes 
were affected in cases where there was a direct increase in the costs to employers but no 
additional benefit conceded to working women. Second, we introduce females working in 
the public sector as a control group for females working in the public sector. Third, this is 
the first to study whether the main stylized facts of changes in maternity leave policy 
holds in a Latin American country. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter intends to discuss the consequences of the changes in maternity leave 
policy using the traditional supply and demand model. 
In the absence of a maternity leave law, a working pregnant woman has two 
options: to return to her current job right after giving birth with no change in her wages or 
to quit her job in order to spend time taking care of her infant. In the latter case, she 
incurs additional costs beyond her current wages and faces lower wages as a result of the 
deprecation of her human capital when she decides to return. 
Maternity leave gives a working woman the right to leave her job for a certain 
time. Female workers who desire to have a child value the maternity leave benefit since it 
permits them to leave work for a certain period of time and return to the same position 
and wage after they have given birth; therefore, they are willing to accept lower wages in 
exchange for a maternity leave benefit, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, the 
introduction of a maternity leave policy (paid or unpaid) or an increase in the benefits of 
maternity shifts rightward fertile women‘s labor supply. The extent of the impact on the 
female labor supply depends on the duration of the leave and the amount of maternity 
leave benefit conceded. 
On the other hand, a mandated maternity leave, paid or unpaid, increases costs to 
employers since firms usually must contract and provide training to a temporary worker 
or even pay overtime hours to other employees in order to compensate for the absence of 
the worker on maternity leave. As a result, a negative impact is expected on fertile 
females‘ labor demand, shifting their labor demand leftward. 
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Another important variable is whether the maternity leave is paid by social 
security, the employer, or both. In cases where employers are also responsible for paying 
wages during the maternity leave, the employers‘ burden increases. As result, the female 
labor demand shift should be larger compared to scenarios where maternity leave is not 
paid by employers. 
As mentioned earlier, the Brazilian Constitution‘s Amendment nº 20 of December 
1998 did not change the length of the maternity leave benefit, but it did establish that the 
employer must make up the difference between regular pay and social security payments 
(limited to R$ 1,200) during a leave of 120 days. Thus, this new policy has an effect only 
on the demand side since the cost to the employer has risen but females‘ benefits have not 
changed. 
Figure 2:  Effect of change in maternity leave of December 1998 on females‘ wages and 
employment assuming perfect competition market. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows how the ceiling on maternity leave benefits paid by INSS should 
affect females‘ wages and employment assuming perfect competition in the markets, 
product, and factor. The horizontal axis represents females‘ employment, and vertical 
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axis the females‘ wages. The females‘ labor demand and labor supply are represented by 
Ld and Ls, respectively. As illustrated, the limited imposed on maternity leave benefit 
increased the cost to contract females, and, consequently Ld shift to the left causing an 
decrease on females‘ wages and employment. 
On the other hand, we can ignore the fact that there are other models that can 
explain this dynamic. For instance, monopsony, a model used previously to explain how 
an increase in minimum wage could positively affect employment, leads to a similar 
result under perfect competition assumption, as can be seen in Figure 3. The supply curve 
is represented by the Ls curve and Ld represents the value of marginal product. The 
ceiling imposed on the maternity leave benefit paid by social security increases the costs 
to the employer, causing a shift of the demand curve to the left. Consequently, females‘ 
employment and wages decrease, ceteris paribus. 
Figure 3:  Effect of change in maternity leave of December 1998 on females‘ wages and 
employment assuming a monopsony market. 
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EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Employment Equation 
An individual makes his/her labor supply decision by maximizing his/her utility 
subject to his/her budget constraint, which is conditional on his/her hourly wage. 
Let Y
* 
be a latent variable determined by: 
Yi
*
 = Xi + i          (1) 
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables affecting labor supply of individual i, is a 
vector of coefficients, and i is a random error. i is assumed to be independent of Xi and 
follows a standard normal distribution. However, we only observe whether a person is 
employed or not, so Y
*
 is not observable. 
That is, 
Yi
*
 >0 if individual i is employed and Yi =1; 
Yi
*
 ≤0 if individual i is not employed and Yi =0. 
From (1), we can derive: 
P(Y=1| Xi)  = P( Yi
*
 >0| Xi) = P(i > - XiXi ) 
  = 1 -  - Xi Xi     (2) 
P(Y=0| Xi)  = P( Yi
*
 ≤ 0| Xi) = P(i ≤ - XiXi ) 
  = 1-  Xi      
where (.) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
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Combining (2) and (3), we have the density function of Yi given Xi: 
F( Y| Xi) = [(Xii)]
Y
 [1 -  Xi)]
1-Y
  for Y=0,1    (4) 
The likelihood function can be written as: 
L=  
n
i 1
=  [(Xii)]
Y
i [1 -  Xi)]
1-Y
i     (5) 
The estimates of i can be found by taking the log of equation (6) and derivate it with 
respect to Xi. 
Hourly Wage Equation 
The hourly wage equation can be written as: 
wi = Xi + i          (6) 
 
where wi is the hourly wage of individual i, Xi is a vector of independent variable that 
affects hourly wage, is a vector of coefficients, and i is a random error that contains 
unobserved characteristics of individual i. i is assumed to be independent of Xi and 
follows a standard normal distribution.  
The fact that we only observe hourly wages for those individuals who are 
employed at the time of the interview may lead to bias due to sample selection. This bias 
can be corrected using the procedure proposed by Heckman (1979), which is 
implemented in two steps. First, we estimate the employment equation as shown in the 
previous subsection and obtain the inverse Mills‘ ratio (i). Second, we include i as a 
regressor in Equation 6 in order to correct for sample selection bias, as can be seen in 
Equation 7: 
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wi = Xi + ii          (7) 
where wi is the hourly wage of individual i, Xi is a vector of independent variable that 
affects hourly wage, is a vector of coefficients, i is a random error that contains 
unobserved characteristics of individual i, and i is the inverse-Mills ratio. i is assumed 
to be independent of Xi and follows a standard normal distribution.  
Identification 
To indentify the impact of the changes in maternity leave policy on females‘ 
earnings and employment, one could simply add an after policy dummy variable in the 
mincerian wage equation for females, as shown in Equation 8. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient 1 fails to capture the net effect of the changes in maternity leave law on 
females‘ observed labor market outcomes (yi) because it also reflects the effect of any 
other change (positive or negative) in the economy and/or labor market during the period 
after the change in maternity leave policy. 
yi  =  + Xi + 1After_Policyi +i       (8) 
 
where  yi  represents the log of earnings in the main job for individual i or a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if individual i is employed and 0 otherwise, Xi  is a vector of 
demographic variables,  After_Policyi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i was 
surveyed after the change in policy, and i is the error term. i is assumed to be 
independent of Xi and follows a standard normal distribution.  
In order to control for any other change in the economy and/or in the labor 
market, the difference-in-difference (DID) method can be applied.. This method requires 
the existence of one demographic group affected by the change (the treatment group) and 
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at least one group not directly affected (the control group). Not being affected by a 
change in policy is not the only requisite for the control group. Most importantly, the 
control group should also have characteristics similar to the treatment group before the 
change in policy, and the composition of treatment and control groups should be stable 
before and after the change in policy. In sum, the control group is used to control for 
systematic changes (i.e., macroeconomic changes and labor market legislation changes) 
in the treatment group. 
Besides the fact that DID is simple and intuitive (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), the 
use of this method to analyze the effects of an exogenous event in a specific group has 
some advantages. For instance, it eliminates problems caused by omitted variables, 
mismeasurement, endogeneity, and attrition (Meyer, 1995). On the other hand, the major 
limitation of this method is to find a control group that is comparable to the treatment 
group to avoid the problem of omitted interactions. In other words, changes in laws and 
in economy usually do not affect all groups similarly (Meyer, 1995). Another limitation 
is the difficultly in generalizing the results found using DID to groups other than the 
treatment group (Meyer, 1995). 
The use of the DID method is sensible in the context of this study since both the 
limit imposed on a maternity leave benefit paid by Brazilian Social Security Service and 
the transfer of responsibility to the employer to pay the remaining wages constitute 
exogenous events. In other words, the decision of imposing a limit on the benefits paid by 
Brazilian Social Security Service, including the maternity leave benefit, had the objective 
of avoiding a future crisis in the Brazilian Social Security System. Due to bad 
administration of the resources in the past and the aging of the population, Brazilian 
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Social Security Service must be reformed and payments of benefits should be 
restructured. 
As mentioned previously, the DID method requires the existence of one 
demographic group affected by the change (the treatment group) and at least one group 
not directly affected (the control group). In this paper, it is assumed that young females 
have a high probability of giving birth and, consequently, taking maternity leave. For this 
reason, they are considered the treatment group. On the other side, young males are not 
affected by changes in maternity leave policy, and older females are supposedly not 
affected by a change in maternity leave policy since they have a low probability of 
having a child. In addition, females working in the public sector are supposedly not 
affected by these changes in policy since the law against discrimination in the labor 
market is highly enforced. Thus, these groups are used as control groups for the treatment 
group of the young females. 
Although most of the studies of the effects of a change in maternity leave policy 
use young males or males as a control group for young females or females, one may 
argue that they are not a good group due to the fact that their labor market outcomes do 
not share similar past patterns. A similar argument can be applied to the use of older 
females as a control group—they are from a different cohort and their wage 
determinations are distinct. Even though the use of males and older females as control 
groups limits the interpretation of the findings of this study, we decided to keep them as 
control groups in order to compare with previous studies in the literature. 
We also use females, young females, and older females working in the public 
sector as control groups for females, young females, and older females working in the 
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private sector. The main hypotheses underlying this choice is that females working in the 
public sector are supposedly not affected by any change in maternity leave since their 
wages cannot be differentiated according to their likelihood of having a child or any other 
kind of discrimination. 
The impact of a change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ wages and 
employment is captured by the coefficient 3. Equation 9 is estimated both for females‘ 
outcomes and for different combinations of treatment and control groups. Equation 9 
presents a simple linear regression specification: 
Yi =  + Xi + 1After_Policyi + 2Treatment1i + 3After_Policy*Treatment1i +i(9) 
where Yi represents the log of earnings in the main job for individual i or a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if individual i is employed and 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of 
demographic variables, After_Policyi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i was 
surveyed after the change in policy, Treatment1i is equal to 1 if individual i belongs to the 
treatment group and 0 otherwise, and i is the error term. i is assumed to be independent 
of Xi and follows a standard normal distribution. 
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DATA 
Datasets 
Two datasets are used in this research: Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME) and 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio (PNAD). Both datasets are household 
surveys managed by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.
10
 The main 
difference between the two datasets is that PME is conducted monthly in the six biggest 
cities in Brazil—São Paulo (SP), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Belo Horizonte (BH), Salvador 
(SA), Recife (RE), and Porto Alegre (POA)—while PNAD is conducted annually, except 
during Census‘ year, in all 27 states in Brazil. 
PME has some advantages compared to PNAD. Its main advantage is that PME 
consists of rotating panel data. In other words, each individual is interviewed during four 
consecutive months (e.g., January 1996 to April 1996), stays out of the survey for the 
following eight months, and is interviewed again for an additional four months (e.g., 
January 1997 to April 1997). In addition, the fact that PME is conducted monthly permits 
us to more precisely control for the three changes in maternity leave policy that occurred 
from December 1998 to March 2003.  
On the other hand, although PME provides most of the control variables usually included 
to estimate wage and employment equations, the survey does not offer a great number of 
control variables compared to PNAD (e.g., race and seniority). For this reason, in this 
study we also use PNAD data to estimate the effect of changes in maternity leave policy. 
The PNAD survey contains more information regarding individuals‘ personal and job 
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 Access to the survey is available at http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/ retrieved on November 25, 2008. 
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characteristics and is conducted in every Brazilian state. The main disadvantage however, 
for this study, is that PNAD is conducted annually and, therefore, does not allow precise 
study of every change in maternity leave policy. 
Variable Definitions 
PME
11
 
This study examines the effect of the changes in maternity leave policy in two 
outcomes: employed and log of hourly wage. Employed is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 when an individual is reported as being employed in the reference week 
and 0 otherwise. Two variables are used to calculate log of hourly wage: monthly 
earnings in the main job and number of hours usually worked per week in the main job.
12
 
Log of hourly wage is equal to monthly earnings in the main job divided by the number 
of hours usually worked per week multiplied by four. 
Education is divided into six categories: 1) less than lower primary, 2) lower 
primary, 3) upper primary, 4) secondary, 5) college, and 6) graduate school. Lower 
primary represents four to seven years of schooling. Upper primary constitutes eight to 
ten years of schooling. Secondary level is usually completed in eleven years. Finally, 
college and graduate school show college and master‘s or doctorate degrees completed, 
respectively. 
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 For detailed information regarding each variable used in this study, see Appendix A. 
12
 The survey offers two alternative measures for earnings: earnings in the main job and earnings in others 
jobs. However, for this study we used the monthly earnings in the main job only. 
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The PME questionnaire does not include any information about years of 
experience, potential experience, or seniority in the current job;
 13
 therefore, we use age 
minus years of education minus 6 as a proxy for years of experience. Experience squared 
is also incorporated in the estimations to allow for a nonlinear relationship between 
experience and wages. 
The PME includes job occupations, which are divided into five categories: 
industry, construction, commerce, service, and other sectors. We control for differences 
in job sectors by including four sector dummy variables (industry, construction, 
commerce, and service) in the estimation of wage equation. We also include dummy 
variables for metropolitan cities and for years. 
PNAD
14
 
Employed and log of hourly wage are defined in the same way as they are when 
using the PME. As mentioned previously, the PNAD has more information regarding 
personal and job characteristics. Thus, we are able to control for race dummies, seniority 
at current job, and a binary indicator for urban residency. 
Although the PNAD does not offer information regarding individuals‘ job 
experience, this dataset includes number of years and/or months that an individual has 
worked at his/her current job and his/her seniority at the current job. To control for 
potential experience and career interruptions, we incorporate seniority at the current job 
in our estimations using the PNAD dataset. 
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In general, Brazilian household surveys do not contain information about years of experience. However, 
seniority in the current job is available in the PNAD survey. 
14
 For detailed information regarding each variable used in this study, refer to Appendix B. 
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The PNAD also provides more detailed information for education. We include 
three variables in our study: years of schooling (which varies from 0 to 15 years) plus a 
binary indicator for college and graduate school. We also have information for 
individuals‘ races. We include binary indicators for black, mixed (Pardo), Asian, and 
native;
15
 the binary indicator for white is omitted. We also add binary variables for 
metropolitan cities and for years when the individual was surveyed. 
The PNAD also provides information regarding females‘ fertility. We can 
calculate how many children each female had and also the year the last child was born. 
These variables are used in the employment equation only. According to the traditional 
theory, number of children and year the last child was born affects females‘ labor supply 
decisions and weekly hours worked. 
Policy Changes 
After a period of turbulence during the 1980s, different reforms were pursued to 
promote growth and stabilize the economy in Brazil. The Reform on the Social Security 
System was one of these reforms, and its main purpose was to prevent a bankruptcy of 
the system in the future. The ability to pay benefits was compromised not only because of 
misuse of funds in the past but also because the pension system was set in such a way that 
its financing was not viable in the long run. 
In order to reduce the volume of payments paid by INSS (Brazilian Social 
Security), a ceiling of R$ 1,200
16
 was imposed on every benefit
17
 paid by the INSS on 
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 Pardo is a classification that encompasses individuals of mixed race. 
16
 US$ 1.00 = R$1.58 on July 26, 2008; US$ 1.00 = R$1.21 in December 1998. Source: Brazilian Central 
Bank (retrieved on July 25, 2008 from http://www.bcb.gov.br/). 
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December 1998.
18
 Consequently, employers became responsible for paying the remaining 
wages to women receiving wages above this ceiling. According to the traditional labor 
demand/supply theory, this change in maternity leave policy is expected to decrease the 
demand for female workers because it would increase costs to their employers. 
One month later, in January 1999, a lawsuit was filed at the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal (Supreme Court) arguing that the ceiling was unconstitutional because the new 
law might discriminate against women in the labor market. In May 1999, the Supremo 
Tribunal Federal temporarily suspended the limit on the maternity leave benefit. The 
limit was permanently cancelled only four years later, in March 2003. 
The period from December 1998 to March 2003 allows us to analyze females‘ 
labor market outcomes from the perspective of two different policy changes. From 
December 1998 to May 1999, we can study the effects of the limit imposed on maternity 
leave benefits paid by the INSS and the transference of responsibility of paying the 
remaining wage to employers on females‘ employment and earnings. Although the period 
of five months may be considered too short to analyze the effects of this change, the 
temporary suspension of this ceiling lasted for about four years. Therefore, we can also 
verify whether females‘ employment and earnings continued to be affected based on the 
fact that employers were uncertain regarding the Supremo‘s final decision. In addition, 
we can also examine whether their wages and employment increased after this limit was 
finally cancelled in March 2003. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17
 INSS-paid benefits include retirement, maternity leave, disability, and so on. 
18
 Amendment nº 20 (artº 14) included in the Constitution imposed this ceiling. 
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Policy Changes Variable Definitions 
PME 
The PME survey allows us to study all of the three changes in maternity leave 
policy that occurred from December 1998 to March 2003. First, we analyze the limit 
imposed on the maternity leave benefit paid by the INSS, which passes the responsibility 
of paying the remaining wages during the leave to employers. This policy change is 
labeled Policy 1. Policy 2A comprises the months from June 1999 to December 2000 
when the ceiling on maternity leave paid by the INSS was temporarily suspended while 
the merit of the cause was being considered by the Supremo.
19
 Policy 2B represents the 
period after the limit on the maternity leave benefit was imposed until it was permanently 
suspended. Policy 3 covers the period after the change in the maternity leave law of 
December 1998 was permanently revoked. 
Table 1: Policy Change Variables: Definitions Using PME Survey 
Dummy Variable Definition 
Policy 1 = 1 if individual i was surveyed from January 1999 to May 1999 
= 0 if individual i was surveyed from January 1996 to June 1998
20
 
Policy 2A = 1 if individual i was surveyed from June 1999 to December 2000 
= 0 if individual i was surveyed from January 1996 to June 1998 
Policy 2B 
= 1 if individual i was surveyed from 1999 to 2002 
= 0 if individual i was surveyed from 1996 to 1998 
Policy 3 = 1 if individual i was surveyed from May 2003 to December 2006 
= 0 if individual i was surveyed from January 1996 to June 1998 
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 We assume that employers might not have changed their decisions until the unconstitutionality of the 
ceiling on maternity leave paid by the INSS was ultimately judged and cancelled in March 2003. 
20
 Considering that some employers might have anticipated this change in policy, we exclude the period 
from July 1998 to December 1998 from our analysis. 
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Table 1 presents a summary of the definitions for the four policy dummy 
variables. In particular, the period from January 1996 to June 1998 was standardized as 
before policy changes for Policy 1, Policy 2A, Policy 2B, and Policy 3. This procedure 
was adopted in order to make easier the comparison of the results for every change in 
policy. 
PNAD 
The PNAD survey does not permit us to study Policies 1 and 2B separately since 
it is an annual survey and the transition from Policy 1 to Policy 2B occurred in middle of 
1999. Unfortunately, we are also not able to study the effect of the permanent cancelation 
of the ceiling on the maternity leave benefit paid because PNAD data for 2005 and 2006 
was not available at the time we started this present work. Table 2 shows how Policy 2B 
is specified for PNAD. 
Table 2: Policy Change Variables: Definitions Using PNAD Survey 
Dummy Variable Definition 
Policy 2B 
= 1 if individual i was surveyed from 1999 to 2002 
= 0 if individual i was surveyed from 1996 to 1998 
 
Samples Construction 
This paper uses the PME survey conducted from January 1996 to Dec 2006 and 
the PNAD survey conducted from 1996 to 2000 and 2002.
21
 The sample is initially 
filtered to include only individuals aged between 20 and 65 years who have no missing 
information for any of the dependent or explanatory variables. 
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 Data for 2001 is excluded since CENSUS was conducted instead of PNAD that year. 
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Table 3: Samples: Treatment and Control Groups Using the PME and PNAD Surveys 
PME PNAD 
Treatment Group: 
Young Females – aged between 20 and 40 years 
Control Groups: 
1) Young Males – aged between 20 and 40 years  
2) Older Females – older than 40 years 
Treatment Group: 
Young Females – aged between 20 and 40 years 
Control Groups: 
1) Young Males – aged between 20 and 40 years 
2) Older Females – older than 40 years 
 Treatment Group: 
Females working in the private sector – aged 
between 20 and 65  
Control Group: 
Females working in the public sector – aged 20 and 
65 years 
 Treatment Group: 
Young Females – with infants  
Control Groups: 
1) Young Males – aged between 20 and 40 years2) 
Older Females – older than 40 years 
 
To construct the wage equation, we focus only on individuals meeting the 
following criteria. First, the individual must work in the formal sector, excluding 
employers and self-employed individuals. Second, the individual must earn at least R$ 
1.00 per hour and not more than R$ 250.00 per hour.  
Using the PNAD survey, we also exclude those individuals whose age minus 
seniority at the current job is less than 14 years, which is the minimum age required for 
anyone to work.
22
 We also exclude females who had more than 20 children and those 
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 We also found some individuals whose seniority years are greater than their years of age. This is 
indicative of measurement error either from the interviewer‘s side or from the interviewee‘s side. 
Therefore, we also exclude these from our sample. 
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who gave birth to their last child when they were younger than 10 years old since it could 
be an indicative of error. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses descriptive statistics for young females, young males, older 
females, females working in the private sector, and females working in the public sector 
used in our estimation of the employment and wage equations. Full tables can be found in 
Appendix B. 
PME 
Tables B1 through B5 in Appendix B present descriptive statistics for employed 
individuals who have hourly wages between R$ 1 and R$ 250 in the formal sector. As 
illustrated in the tables, young males are more likely to be head of household (60%) than 
young females (23%) and older females (43%). From 1996 to 1998, young male workers 
were concentrated in industry (33%) and service (44%) occupations while young females 
were mainly in service (59%), industry (20%), and commerce (17%) occupations. In 
contrast, older females are predominantly in service (70%) occupations. During 1999 and 
2002, young males, young females, and older females intensified their participation in 
service occupations by 8%, 3%, and 3%, respectively. Nevertheless, the service sector 
narrowed after 2003, causing a reduction of young males‘, young females‘, and older 
females‘ participation by approximately 2%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4 displays the average of hourly wages and hours of work per week for 
young males, young females, and older females before and after the changes in maternity 
leave policy. Young females earn less than young males and older females, on average, in 
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every period. However, the gender wage gap for young females narrowed over these 
periods. As expected, young males work more hours per week than young females; 
however, the hours gap has been reducing since 1996. 
Table 4: PME: Summary for Average of Hourly Wage and Hours Worked per Week 
Period 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Hourly Hours Hourly Hours Hourly Hours 
Wage per Week Wage per Week Wage per Week 
Before Policy 3.969 43.253 3.446 39.987 4.351 39.25 
After Policy1 4.002 43.066 3.608 40.213 4.355 39.577 
After Policy2B 4.057 43.711 3.738 40.758 4.675 39.929 
After Policy3 4.942 44.301 4.733 41.767 6.45 40.859 
 
PNAD 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the control and treatment groups before 
and after the limit on maternity leave benefit paid by Brazilian social security was 
established. Table 5 shows that hourly wages of young males, young females, and older 
females increased by 4.22%, 5.07%, and 11.09%, respectively. However, young females 
continued with the lowest hourly wages, on average, compared to the other two groups. 
Young females and older females worked similar numbers of hours per week before and 
after the change in policy, and young males worked approximately 6 hours more than 
young females. Before the change in policy, young females and older females were 
mainly concentrated in services occupations—67% and 80% respectively. Their 
participation in service occupations reduced during the period after the change in policy. 
Indeed, it seems that females mostly migrated to transportation and communication 
occupations. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics—Before and After Change in Maternity Leave Policy 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Before 
Policy 
After 
Policy 
Before 
Policy 
After 
Policy 
Before 
Policy 
After 
Policy 
Hourly Wages 3.711 3.868 3.644 3.829 4.809 5.342 
Hours Worked 
per week 
44.314 44.443 37.836 38.626 36.442 37.117 
Seniority 4.497 4.220 4.736 4.306 11.516 11.330 
Transportation & 
Communication 
8.86% 13.48% 2.26% 8.96% 2.00% 10.13% 
Industry 37.80% 36.39% 16.17% 16.28% 11.54% 11.50% 
Commerce 14.43% 17.38% 15.06% 16.95% 6.25% 6.90% 
Service  38.91% 32.75% 66.51% 57.81% 80.21% 71.47% 
Urban  93.73% 94.82% 94.68% 95.16% 95.42% 95.18% 
Head of 
Household 
67.07% 64.51% 20.53% 21.55% 37.99% 38.83% 
Observations 62,609 73,697 37,549 48,119 14,424 20,036 
 
Figure 4 shows hourly wages for young males, young females, and older females 
for the period from 1996 to 2002. As can be seen, young females earned less per hour 
than young males and older females, on average. Before the changes in maternity leave 
policy, from 1996–2002, hourly wages of older females and young females exhibited 
similar trends, while young males presented a higher growth of hourly wages in 1997. 
After the introduction of the limit on the maternity leave benefit in December 1998, we 
notice that older females‘ hourly wages increased in higher rates than those of young 
females did, which suggests that young females were more affected by this change in 
maternity leave policy. Young males‘ hourly wages grew more than young females‘ 
except in 1999, when their hourly wages decreased by 1.44%. 
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Figure 4: Averages of Hourly Wages, 1996–2002 
 
Source: PNAD 
 
The average years of schooling for young males, young females, and older 
females from 1996 through 2002 are displayed in Figure 5. As can be seen from the 
figure, young females have more years of schooling than young males and older females. 
Although young females‘ years of schooling have not changed much during these years, 
it seems that young males are still far from closing the schooling gap. Indeed, young 
males had 2.5 fewer years of schooling than young females in 2002. This sheds light on 
the fact that discrimination, experience, and occupation all play an important role to 
explain the gender gap in Brazil. 
We also examine gender wage gap by levels of schooling from 1996 to 2002, as 
illustrated in Figure 6. As displayed, the gender wage gap rises as level of schooling 
increases. In other words, the gender wage gap for those who completed a master‘s or  
doctorate degree is the largest, while the gender wage gap is smaller for those who 
completed only lower primary (four years of schooling). 
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Figure 5: Averages of Years of Schooling, 1996–2002 
 
Source: PNAD 
 
Figure 6: Gender Wage Gap between Young Females and Young Males by Level of 
Schooling, 1996–2002 
 
Source: PNAD 
 
Figure 7 shows the average of hourly wages for females in the private sector and 
the public sector from 1996 to 2002. Young females working in the public sector earned 
more than young females in the private sector. From 1999 to 2002, young females in the 
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public sector presented higher rates of growth in their hourly wages compared to young 
females in the private sector. 
Figure 7: Average of Hourly Wages for Young Females by Sector 
 
 
In sum, the control groups have different characteristics compared to the 
treatment group (i.e., years of and level of education, job occupations, and labor force 
participation). However, these differences are controlled in our estimation. Although the 
treatment and control groups present similar trends before the changes in maternity leave 
policy (Figures 4 and 7), the fact that they face different levels of gender discrimination 
and engagement in the labor market is the limitation of this paper. This limitation could 
have been overcome if these changes in maternity leave policy occurred in some states 
before the federal law passed (Gruber, 1994; Waldfogel, 1999). Unfortunately, this is not 
the case. 
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RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results for employment and hourly wage by control 
group. The coefficients on the effect of changes in maternity leave policy, their standard 
errors, and number of observations are in the text; full tables can be found in the 
Appendix C. 
Older females as a Control Group for Young Females 
Hourly Wages 
As mentioned previously, we used different groups to capture the effects of the 
changes in maternity leave policy on young females‘ wages and employment. The first 
control group is composed of older females between 41 and 65 years old. 
Table 10 presents the results for the estimation of the effect of changes in 
maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control 
group. Similar to our previous estimations, Heckman‘s correction is applied and the 
correction function is statistically significant in every equation. 
The first column shows the results for the policy changes using the PME dataset. 
The maternity leave policy changes of December 1998 and May 1999 had positive but 
small effects on young females‘ hourly wages; however, they are not statistically 
significant. Policy 2A was found to negatively affect young females—at first young 
females‘ hourly wages might not be affected, but in the following year they decrease by 
1.4% compared to older females‘ hourly wages. This result is consistent with the theory 
under the assumption that wages are usually bound by contracts or agreements and, 
therefore, usually take time to be adjusted. On the other hand, the coefficient of Policy 2B 
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is positive, suggesting that young females‘ hourly wages recovered in the second year, 
when the limit on maternity leave benefits was temporally suspended. Not surprisingly, 
the permanent suspension of the limit on maternity leave benefits paid by Brazilian 
Social Security significantly increased young females‘ hourly wages by 3.7%. 
Table 6: Older Females as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Young Females‘ Hourly Wages 
Variable PME PNAD 
 Policy 1 
Coefficients 0.001  
Robust Standard Errors [0.005] — 
Number of Observations 171,290  
 Policy 2A 
Coefficients –0.014  
Robust Standard Errors [0.005]*** — 
Number of Observations 255,222  
 Policy 2B 
Coefficients 0.009 –0.043 
[0.007]*** 
120,128 
Robust Standard Errors [0.005]** 
Number of Observations 315,323 
 Policy 3 
Coefficients 0.037  
Robust Standard Errors [0.004]*** — 
Number of Observations 420,536  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 10 also reports results for the effect of changes to the maternity leave policy 
on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control group and using the 
PNAD dataset (Column 2). The limit on maternity leave benefits and its temporary 
suspension (Policy 2B) had a negative and statistically significant impact on young 
females‘ hourly wages. In essence, young females‘ hourly wages decreased by 4.3% 
compared to older females‘ hourly wages. Similar to the findings using young males as a 
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control group, these effects found using the PNAD survey are bigger compared to those 
we found using the PME survey. 
Table 7: Young Males as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity Leave 
Policy on young Females‘ Hourly Wages by Wage levels 
Variables 
PME PNAD 
w≤800 w≤1,200 w≤1,600 w≤800 w≤1,200 w≤1,600 
  Policy 1 
Coefficients –0.007 –0.002 0.000 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Number of 
Observations 
144,065 157,420 163,118 
  Policy 2A 
Coefficients –0.014 –0.011 –0.011 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.004] 
*** 
[0.004] 
** 
[0.005] 
** 
Number of 
Observations 
214,286 234,101 242,578 
  Policy 2B 
Coefficients 0.004 0.008 0.009 –0.031 –0.032 –0.035 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.004] [0.004] 
** 
[0.004] 
** 
[0.006] 
*** 
[0.006] 
*** 
[0.007] 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
287,821 287,821 298,514 99,427 109,368 113,527 
  Policy 3 
Coefficients 0.017 0.032 0.038 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.003] 
*** 
[0.004] 
*** 
[0.004] 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
322,554 364,651 383,338 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Analyzing the effects of the changes in maternity leave policy on young females 
by their wage levels using the PME dataset, we found that the increase in the costs to 
employers had no instant effect on young females‘ hourly wages. However, we notice 
that this change negatively affected young females‘ hourly wages during the period when 
the ceiling was temporary suspended. In particular, the wages of young females who 
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Table 8: Older Females as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Females‘ Hourly Wages by Their Children‘s Ages  
 
Variable PNAD 
 All females 
Coefficients –0.043 
Robust Standard Errors [0.007]*** 
Number of Observations 120,128 
 Females without children 
Coefficients –0.030 
Robust Standard Errors [0.017]* 
Number of Observations 43,882 
 Females with a child—age≤1 
Coefficients –0.042 
Robust Standard Errors [0.014]*** 
Number of Observations 41,684 
 Females with a child—age >1 and age≤2 
Coefficients –0.052 
Robust Standard Errors [0.017]*** 
Number of Observations 38,781 
 Females with a child—age >2 and age≤6 
Coefficients –0.041 
Robust Standard Errors [0.010]*** 
Number of Observations 49,859 
 Females with a child—age >6 and age≤10 
Coefficients –0.039 
Robust Standard Errors [0.012]*** 
Number of Observations 45,146 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
earned R$ 800 or less reduced by 1.4% compared to older females. Although young 
females who earned R$ 800 seem to be more affected, the negative impact on these 
females was slightly bigger from what we found for young females who earned R$ 1,600 
or less. We also observe that after the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits was 
permanently suspended, young females‘ hourly wages increased significantly more 
compared to older females‘ hourly wages for every hourly wage category. Comparing 
these findings to the results using the PNAD survey, we verify a different dynamic. In 
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fact, the impact on young females‘ hourly wages becomes slightly stronger as their wages 
increase. 
Table 12 documents how the changes in maternity leave policy impacted young 
females according to ages of their children using older females as a control group. It was 
found that young females who have children between 1 and 2 years old were more 
negatively affected. In particular, their hourly wages decreased by 5.2% compared to 
older females, while young females without children had a negative impact of 2.2% less. 
Employment 
Table 13 shows the effect of the changes in maternity leave policy on young 
females‘ employment using older females as a control group. Policy 1 and Policy 2A 
coefficients indicate that policy changes decreased the probability of a young female 
being employed by 0.5 and 0.1 percentage points, respectively, while Policy 2B increased 
the probability of a young female being employed by 3 percentage points. However, 
these are not statistically significant at the level of 5%. Policy 3 showed a negative but 
smaller effect on young females‘ employment. In sum, young females‘ employment was 
lightly affected by the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits, and this persisted even 
after this change in maternity leave policy was permanently cancelled. 
Our estimation using the PNAD dataset reveals that the probability of a young 
female being employed seems not to be different from the probability of older females 
being employed as a result of maternity leave policy changes. In addition, we also 
examined whether the changes in maternity leave policy had a positive impact on young 
females‘ employment in the public sector. Our results lead us to conclude that young 
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females‘ employment in the public sector did not change compared to older females‘ 
employment in the same sector. 
Table 9: Older Females as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Young Females‘ Employment 
Variables 
PME PNAD 
Private and  
Public Sectors 
Private and  
Public Sectors 
Public Sector 
 Policy 1 
Marginal Effects 0.005 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.003]* 
Number of Observations 1,018,352 
 Policy 2A 
Marginal Effects 0.001 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.002] 
Number of Observations 1,474,593 
 Policy 2B 
Marginal Effects 0.030 –0.011 –0.006 
Robust Standard Errors [0.002]* [0.003] [0.006] 
Number of Observations 1,810,580 503,216 139,769 
 Policy 3 
Marginal Effects –0.001 
 Robust Standard Errors [0.001] 
Number of Observations 2,454,140 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Females Working in the Public Sector as a Control Group for  
Females Working in the Private sector 
Hourly Wages 
Gender discrimination is usually not present or, at least, is reduced in the public 
sector. Furthermore, females working in the public sector should not be affected by any 
of these changes in maternity leave policy based on the fact that their wages, initial 
position, and employment cannot be decided according to their probability of them 
having a child and, consequently, taking maternity leave. Therefore, we also analyzed the 
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impact of the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits paid by Brazilian Social Security 
on females working in the private sector using females working in the public sector as a 
control group. As previously mentioned, the PME does not present any information 
regarding whether an individual works in the private or public sector. Hence, we used 
only the PNAD dataset for this estimation. 
Table 10 : Females Working in the Public Sector as a Control Group: The Effect of the 
Changes in Maternity Leave Policy on the Hourly Wages of Females Working in the 
Private Sector 
Variable 
PNAD 
Full Sample w<800 w≤1,200 w≤,600 
 Females 
Coefficients –0.096 –0.086 –0.090 0.025 
Robust Standard Errors [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.018] 
Number of Observations 120,128 99,427 109,368 10,760 
 Young Females 
Coefficients –0.097 –0.087 –0.091 0.010 
Robust Standard Errors [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.023] 
Number of Observations 85,668 73,177 79,624 6,044 
 Older Females 
Coefficients –0.088 –0.079 –0.084 0.065 
Robust Standard Errors [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.030]** 
Number of Observations 31,200 23,807 26,919 4,281 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14 shows the results of the effect of the changes in maternity leave policy 
on females‘ hourly wages for those working in the private sector using females working 
in the public sector as a control group. Similar to our previous estimations, the 
Heckman‘s correction was implemented to correct for sample selection bias; however, 
the correction term does not enter significantly in any of the equations. For these reasons, 
the results presented are not corrected for sample selection bias. 
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Our results suggest that hourly wages for females in the private sector were 
reduced by 9.8% compared to those of females working in the public sector after the 
change in maternity leave policy. Analyzing young and older females in the private sector 
separately, we also notice that the policy change had a negative impact on both groups, 
with young females being significantly more affected. To illustrate, young females‘ 
hourly wages in the private sector decreased by 9.7% while older females‘ hourly wages 
in the private sector decreased by 8.8%. Moreover, we also found that females who 
earned R$1,200 were more affected by these changes in maternity leave policy. 
Young males as a control group for young females 
As mentioned previously, men and women do not have similar trends in the labor 
market (e.g., labor force participation, gender discrimination, schooling gap, etc.), and 
demand and supply shocks may affect them differently. Consequently, young males 
should not be a suitable control group for young males. Despite of this fact, we also 
studied the effects of the changes maternity leave policy on females‘ labor market 
outcomes using young males as a control group. 
Hourly Wages 
We analyzed the impact of the changes in maternity leave policy from December 
1998 to March 2003 using two household surveys, the PME and the PNAD. The variable 
of interest is the interaction of after policy and female dummy variables. While most 
papers that analyze the effects of maternity leave policy changes on females‘ wages do 
not correct for sample selection bias, except the paper by Baum (2003), we apply the 
traditional two-step procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) to account for possible 
sample selection bias. The results before correction are reported in Appendix C.  
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Even though our results are not significantly different from those without 
correction for sample selection, the correction function enters significantly at the 1% 
confidence level in the four cases estimated, suggesting a presence of sample selection 
bias. 
Table 11: Young Males as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Young Females‘ Hourly Wages for All Young Females 
 
Variable PME PNAD 
 Policy 1 
Coefficients 0.010 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.005]** 
Number of Observations 330,893 
 Policy 2A 
Coefficients 0.013 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.003]*** 
Number of Observations 479,824 
 Policy 2B 
Coefficients 0.025 0.033 
Robust Standard Errors [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
Number of Observations 597,048 221,974 
 Policy 3 
Coefficients 0.051*** 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.003] 
Number of Observations 788,190 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6 presents the effects of maternity leave policy changes using both datasets, 
PME and PNAD. Using the PME survey, our results indicate that the changes in 
maternity leave policy
23
 positively affected young females‘ hourly wages. Young 
                                                 
 
23
 See Tables 1 and 2 for definitions of policy dummy variables used in our estimation. 
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females‘ hourly wages increased by about 1%, 1.3%, 2.5%, and 5.1% after Policy 1, 2A, 
2B and 3, respectively, compared to young males‘ hourly wages (Table 6). 
In addition, we also notice that the positive effects on young females‘ hourly 
wages increase over the periods analyzed. More specifically, young females‘ hourly 
wages increased by 5% compared to young males‘ hourly wages after the limit on the 
maternity leave benefit was permanently suspended, while their hourly wages increased 
by only half during whole period when this limit was imposed and temporally suspended 
by the Supremo. Therefore, the fact that young females‘ hourly wages did not decrease 
compared to young males does not necessary mean that young females were not affected. 
In fact, the maternity leave policy of December 2008 could have slowed down the gender 
gap narrowing by reducing young females‘ hourly wages growth. 
As mentioned previously, the PNAD data does not allow us to study Policy 1 
separately since it is an annual survey. As can be seen in the Policy 2B section 2 of Table 
7, the effect of the limit on maternity leave benefits paid by social security was also 
positive. In particular, young females‘ hourly wages increased approximately 3% 
compared to young males‘ hourly wages. Comparing results from the PNAD and PME 
surveys, it can be seen that the effects are smaller using the PME survey rather than the 
PNAD survey. This may be due to the fact that the PNAD permits us to control for race 
and seniority at the current job and, therefore, the results using the PME survey could be 
underestimating the effects of changes in maternity leave policy on young females‘ 
hourly wages. 
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Table 12: Young Males as a Control Group: The Effects of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Young Females‘ Hourly Wages by Wage Levels 
 
Variable 
PME PNAD 
w≤800 w≤1,200 w≤1,600 w≤800 w≤1,200 w≤1,600 
 Policy 1 
Coefficients –0.009 –0.005 0.002 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.004] 
** 
[0.005] 
** 
[0.005] 
Number of 
Observations 
272,883 301,248 312,858 
  Policy 2A 
Coefficients –0.009 –0.001 0.002 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.003] 
*** 
[0.003] [0.003] 
Number of 
Observations 
396,865 437,039 453,773 
  Policy 2B 
Coefficients 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.025 0.029 0.032 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.002] [0.002] 
** 
[0.003] 
*** 
[0.004] 
*** 
[0.004] 
*** 
[0.004] 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
491,843 542,589 563,505 185,485 203,776  210,894 
  Policy 3 
Coefficients 0.029 0.022 0.023 
— 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
[0.002] 
*** 
[0.002] 
*** 
[0.002] 
*** 
Number of 
Observations 
611,232 698,481 731,514 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Analyzing these changes on maternity leave policy by wage levels, it seems that 
the ceiling imposed on maternity leave benefits paid by Brazilian Social Security, Policy 
1, had a small but negative effect on young females who earn R$ 1,200 or less. On the 
other side, this negative effect does not persist after the temporary suspension of the 
ceiling. In addition, it can also be observed that young females‘ hourly wages increased 
considerably compared to young males after the ceiling imposed on maternity leave 
benefits was permanent cancelled, Policy 3. 
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The effect of the changes in maternity leave policy in relation to a female‘s 
child‘s age is documented in Table 8. According to the results, it seems that young 
females who have a child between 1 and 2 years old were more affected compared to the 
other young females. For instance, the hourly wages of females without children 
increased 3.5% compared to young males, while young females with a child between 6 
and 10 years old had an increase of 4.1%. 
Table 13: Young Males as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Females‘ Hourly Wage by Their Children‘s Ages  
 
Variable PNAD 
 All females 
Coefficients 0.033 
Robust Standard Errors [0.005]*** 
Number of Observations 221,974 
 Females without children 
Coefficients 0.035 
Robust Standard Errors [0.006] *** 
Number of Observations 174,762 
 Females with a child—age≤1 
Coefficients 0.035 
Robust Standard Errors [0.013]*** 
Number of Observations 143,530 
 Females with a child—age >1 and age≤2 
Coefficients 0.034 
Robust Standard Errors [0.016]** 
Number of Observations 140,627 
 Females with a child—age >2 and age≤6 
Coefficients 0.037 
Robust Standard Errors [0.009]*** 
Number of Observations 151,705 
 Females with a child—age >6 and age≤10 
Coefficients 0.041 
Robust Standard Errors [0.011]*** 
Number of Observations 146,992 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Employment 
We also examined how the changes in maternity leave policy affected young 
females‘ employment. Table 9 presents the marginal effects for the estimation of the 
probability of being employed using a Probit model. Our results reveal that Policies 1, 
2A, 2B, and 3 all had positive and statistically significant impact on young females‘ 
employment. In other words, Policies 1, 2A, 2B, and 3 increased the probability of a 
young female being employed by 4, 3.4, 4.6, and 7 percentage points, respectively. 
Similar to the hourly wages increase, the probability of a young female being employed 
increased, especially after the permanent suspension of the ceiling on maternity leave 
benefits paid by Brazilian Social Security. 
Table 14: Young Males as a Control Group: The Effect of the Changes in Maternity 
Leave Policy on Young Females‘ Employment 
Variables 
PME PNAD 
Private and  
Public Sectors 
Private and  
Public Sectors 
Public Sector 
 Policy 1 
Marginal Effects 0.040 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.002]*** 
Number of Observations 1,134,643 
 Policy 2A 
Marginal Effects 0.034 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.002]*** 
Number of Observations 1,631,169 
 Policy 2B 
Marginal Effects 0.046 0.031 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.003] 
Number of Observations 2,000,808 603,433 258,873 
 Policy 3 
Marginal Effects 0.070 
— Robust Standard Errors [0.001]*** 
Number of Observations 2,454,140 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Using the PNAD dataset, Policy 2B caused promoted a decrease in the probability 
of young female being employed by 0.3 percentage points as compared to young males. 
However, this is not statistically significant. 
Another interesting fact is that young females‘ employment in the public sector 
appears not to have been affected by the changes in maternity leave policy, a different 
result than expected. Due to the fact that females working in the public were not affected 
by any of these changes in maternity leave policy, we expected a significant migration of 
young females from the private sector to the public in order to avoid lower wages as 
result of costs transferred to employers in the private sector. 
Discussion 
One plausible explanation for the fact that the young females were positively 
affected is that young males, although are in the same age range, might not be a suitable 
control group for young females considering that their labor supply decisions and labor 
market outcomes have different trends. For instance, female labor force has been 
increasing dramatically over the last three decades, leading to positive supply. In 
addition, the fact that females are also more engaged in the labor market promoted not 
only an increase in their experience and labor market skills but also a reduction on gender 
discrimination leading to a positive shock on the demand for young females. This both 
positive supply and demand shocks are not controlled when we use young males as a 
control group giving us the false impression that young females benefited from the 
changes in maternity leave policy. For this reason, our results could indicate that the 
ceiling imposed on maternity leave benefits caused a slowdown in the growth of young 
females‘ hourly wage and employment. 
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On the other side, our findings using older females as a control group are partially 
consistent with the theory. Indeed, the limit imposed on the maternity leave benefits paid 
by Brazilian Social Security and the transfer of the responsibility of paying the remaining 
wages to employers negatively affected young females‘ hourly wages, and this negative 
effect persisted even when this change was temporally suspended. However, these 
changes in maternity leave policy did not have a significant effect on young female‘s 
employment. This scenario may be caused by a stronger increase in young females‘ labor 
supply than older females‘ labor supply. 
In order to control for labor demand and supply shocks that affect different groups 
of workers, we used an alternative control group, females working in the public sector, 
under the assumption that they were not affected by these changes in maternity leave 
policy. Our results show that these changes had a negative impact on females working in 
the private sector. In addition, we found that young females working in the private sector 
were more affected than older females working in the private sector. These results are 
consistent with the theory since young females have a higher probability of having a child 
compared to older females. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In December 1998, a ceiling of R$ 1,200 was imposed on every maternity leave 
benefit paid by Brazilian Social Security and employers became responsible for paying 
the remaining wages for females receiving earnings above this ceiling. In May 1999, this 
ceiling was temporarily suspended for almost four years before it was finally judged and 
cancelled in March 2003. 
The research presented in this dissertation examined the effects of the change to 
the maternity leave legislation in Brazil of December 1998, May 1999, and March 2003 
on females‘ hourly wages and employment using the difference-in-difference estimator. 
The empirical analyses used two different household surveys: the Pesquisa Mensal de 
Emprego (PME) from 1996 to 2006 (2001 excluded) and the Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra à Domicilio (PNAD) from 1996 to 2002 (2000 excluded). Both surveys are 
conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.
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The analyses used three treatment groups: 1) young females, aged 20 to 40 years, 
2) young females working in the private sector, 3) older females, aged 41 to 65 years, 
working in the private sector, and 4) young females with infants. Young females were 
selected based on the fact that they have a higher probability of giving birth compared to 
older females and, consequently, using the maternity leave benefit. The second and third 
groups were supposedly the groups directly reached by these changes in maternity leave 
policy since earnings and employment in the public sector should not be based on an 
individual‘s gender and therefore discrimination may be absent or less prevalent there 
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than in the private sector. We also include young females with infants as a treatment 
group since employers may use this information to infer the probability of a female 
having another child. We also propose four control groups: 1) older females aged 
between 41 and 65 years, 2) young females working in the public sector, 3) older females 
working in the public sector, and 4) young males. 
Using older females as a control group for young females, we found that the limit 
imposed on the maternity leave benefit paid by Social Security did not affect young 
females‘ hourly wages initially. However, young females‘ hourly wages did decrease by 
1.4% compared to older females‘ hourly wages from June 1999 to December 2000. After 
including 2002 in our estimations, our results indicate a possible recovery of this negative 
effect (–1.4%) on young females‘ hourly wages. After the permanent cancellation of the 
limit on maternity leave benefits, an increase of 3.7% on young females‘ hourly wages 
compared to older females‘ hourly wages was verified. Regarding the impact on 
employment, it seems that the changes in maternity leave policy did not significantly 
affect young females‘ employment. 
In addition, we also used females working in the public sector as a control group 
for females working in the private sector, under the hypothesis that discrimination is less 
prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector. Our results suggest that females 
working in the private sector had their hourly wages reduced 9.6% compared to females 
working in the public sector as a result of the change in maternity policy of December 
2008. Analyzing young and older females working in the private sector separately, we 
found that young females‘ hourly wages decreased 9.7% while older females‘ hourly 
wages were reduced 8.8%. The fact that young females were more penalized by the 
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changes in maternity leave policy is consistent with the theory that they have a higher 
probability of getting pregnant and consequently taking a maternity leave. 
On the other hand, we found a positive impact of the changes in maternity leave 
policy on young females‘ wages and employment using young males as a control group. 
However, our results also suggest that this positive effect grew larger throughout the 
period analyzed, which could be an indication that young females‘ hourly wages grew 
faster than young males‘ wages after the temporary suspension of the limit on the 
maternity leave benefit paid by the INSS. Although our findings do not show a negative 
impact as predicted by theory, our findings could be explained by the fact that the 
increase in young females‘ commitment in the labor market may have led to a reduction 
of gender discrimination large enough to overcome the negative impact caused by the 
raise in the costs to employers in hiring young females. The fact that females and males 
present different trends in the labor market and, consequently, have different demand and 
supply shocks could be one explanation why the negative impact on females‘ labor 
market outcomes was not verified. Therefore, young males might not be a suitable 
control group for young females.  
Overall, our results show that the limit imposed on maternity leave benefits paid 
by Social Security and the transfer of the responsibility of paying the remaining wages to 
employers negatively affected females‘ hourly wages, and this negative effect seems to 
have persisted even while the limit was temporarily suspended. Furthermore, young 
females were more affected by the change in policy than older females. These results lead 
us to think that these changes in maternity leave policy may have slowed the convergence 
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of females‘ wages toward males‘ wages or ―forced‖ females to swim upstream during the 
period from May 1999 to March 2003. 
This dissertation presents some limitations; the most important concern is about 
three control groups: 1) young males, 2) older females, and 3) females working in the 
private sector. As shown, these control groups have different characteristics compared to 
the treatment groups (i.e., education levels, job occupations, and labor force 
participation). However, these differences were controlled for in our estimation. 
Although the treatment and control groups present similar trends before the changes in 
maternity leave policy (Figures 4 and 7), the fact that they face different levels of gender 
discrimination and engagement in the labor market is the limitation of this paper. This 
could be overcome if these changes in maternity leave policy occurred in some states 
before the federal law was passed (Gruber, 1994; Waldfogel, 1999). Unfortunately, this 
was not the case of our study. In addition, some important variables were missing from 
the PME data, such as race and urban residence. The first two variables were present in 
the PNAD survey and were controlled for in our estimation using this survey. Although 
information for years of experience is not present in either survey, the PNAD presents a 
better potential experience estimation than age minus years of experience minus six. In 
particular, The PNAD has information for seniority in the current job. Second, the period 
when the limit on maternity leave benefits paid by Social Security was in effect was short 
(only five months); such a short period creates difficulty in analyzing this change on 
females‘ hourly wages and employment. 
As far as hourly wages of females and gender discrimination are concerned, our 
results imply that policies that directly affect females in the labor market by increasing 
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the costs to employers while conceding no additional benefit to the female workers need 
to be carefully studied before they are implemented, because they can go against the 
polices that protect female workers and slow down the continuous improvement in the 
labor market. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
PME 
Variable Definition 
Year Year when individual i was interviewed 
Month Month when individual i was interviewed 
UF Metropolitan Region where individual i lives 
Age Age when individual i was interviewed 
Female 
=1 if individual i is female 
=0 otherwise 
Headh 
= 1 if individual i is head of household where he/she lives 
=0 otherwise 
Lower Primary 
= 1 if individual i has 1 to 4 years of schooling 
=0 otherwise 
Upper Primary 
= 1 if individual i has 5 to 8 years of schooling 
=0 otherwise 
Secondary 
= 1 if individual i has 9 to 11 years of schooling 
=0 otherwise 
College 
= 1 if individual i has a college degree 
=0 otherwise 
Graduate School 
= 1 if individual i has a master or doctorate degree 
=0 otherwise 
Employed 
= 1 if individual i has positive wage 
=0 otherwise 
Industry 
= 1 if individual i works in industry occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Construction 
= 1 if individual i works in construction occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Commerce 
= 1 if individual i works in commerce occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Service 
= 1 if individual i works in service occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Other Sectors 
= 1 if individual i works in any other occupation 
=0 otherwise 
W Monthly earnings in the main job 
Hour Number of hours worked per week 
Hourlyw W/(Hour*4) 
Logw Ln of W 
Loghw Ln of Hourly Wage 
Experience Age – years of schooling - 6 
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PNAD 
Variable Definition 
Year Year when individual i was interviewed 
UF State where individual i lives 
Age Age when individual i was interviewed 
Female 
=1 if individual i is female 
=0 otherwise 
Headh 
= 1 if individual i is head of household where he/she lives 
=0 otherwise 
White 
= 1 if individual i is white 
=0 otherwise 
Black 
= 1 if individual i is black 
=0 otherwise 
Mixed 
= 1 if individual i pardo 
=0 otherwise 
Asian 
= 1 if individual i is asian descendent 
=0 otherwise 
Native 
= 1 if individual i is Brazilian‘s native (Indian) 
=0 otherwise 
Migrant 
= 1 if individual i lives in a different where he/she was born 
=0 otherwise 
Years of Schooling Number of years of schooling individual i has completed 
College 
= 1 if individual i has a college degree 
=0 otherwise 
Graduate School 
= 1 if individual i has a master or doctorate degree 
=0 otherwise 
Transp&Com 
= 1 if individual i works in transportation or communication 
occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Industry 
= 1 if individual i works in industry occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Commerce 
= 1 if individual i works in commerce occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Service 
= 1 if individual i works in service occupation 
=0 otherwise 
Employed 
= 1 if individual i has positive wage 
=0 otherwise 
Urban 
= 1 if individual i lives in a urban area 
=0 otherwise 
58 
 
58 
 
(end) 
Variable Definition 
W Monthly earnings in the main job 
Hour number of hours worked per week 
Hourlyw W/(Hour*4) 
Logw Ln of W 
Loghw Ln of Hourly Wage 
Seniority Number of years working at the current job 
Number of 
Children 
Individual i ‗s number of children 
This data is only available for females 
Year Last Children 
Year when the last children was born 
This data is only available for females 
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APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
PME 
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics for Young Males, Young Females and Older Females before change in Maternity Leave Policy 
 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loghw 1.051 0.725 0 5.234 0.937 0.702 0 4.868 1.051 0.830 0 4.828 
Exp 22.074 7.364 4 40 19.634 7.490 4 40 40.554 8.237 24 65 
Exp squared  541.485 341.457 16 1600 441.596 324.660 16 1600 1712.497 695.271 576 4225 
PE 0.099 0.299 0 1 0.086 0.280 0 1 0.091 0.288 0 1 
BA 0.070 0.255 0 1 0.062 0.241 0 1 0.070 0.254 0 1 
MG 0.186 0.389 0 1 0.159 0.366 0 1 0.131 0.337 0 1 
RJ 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.196 0.397 0 1 
RS 0.185 0.388 0 1 0.214 0.410 0 1 0.239 0.427 0 1 
Lower primary 0.370 0.483 0 1 0.217 0.412 0 1 0.347 0.476 0 1 
Upper primary 0.227 0.419 0 1 0.186 0.389 0 1 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Secondary  0.281 0.449 0 1 0.423 0.494 0 1 0.132 0.338 0 1 
College  0.078 0.269 0 1 0.149 0.356 0 1 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Graduate School 0.002 0.042 0 1 0.002 0.049 0 1 0.006 0.075 0 1 
Industry  0.325 0.468 0 1 0.201 0.401 0 1 0.161 0.367 0 1 
Construction  0.058 0.234 0 1 0.011 0.105 0 1 0.008 0.090 0 1 
Commerce  0.148 0.355 0 1 0.173 0.379 0 1 0.080 0.271 0 1 
Service  0.444 0.497 0 1 0.589 0.492 0 1 0.704 0.457 0 1 
Hour  43.253 7.062 1 98 39.987 7.668 1 98 39.250 8.232 2 98 
Observations 174,662 106,677 37,349 
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Table B2: Descriptive Statistics for Employed Young Males, Young Females and Older Females after Policy 1 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loghw 1.069 0.712 0 5.234 0.970 0.709 0 4.679 1.057 0.814 0 4.317 
Exp 21.670 7.381 4 40 19.371 7.514 4 40 40.577 8.114 25 65 
Exp squared  524.078 334.510 16 1600 431.694 319.879 16 1600 1712.299 688.426 625 4225 
PE 0.098 0.297 0 1 0.085 0.279 0 1 0.074 0.262 0 1 
BA 0.116 0.321 0 1 0.097 0.296 0 1 0.122 0.327 0 1 
MG 0.215 0.411 0 1 0.198 0.399 0 1 0.177 0.381 0 1 
RJ 0.162 0.368 0 1 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.172 0.378 0 1 
RS 0.162 0.369 0 1 0.191 0.393 0 1 0.216 0.411 0 1 
Lower primary 0.340 0.474 0 1 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.338 0.473 0 1 
Upper primary 0.240 0.427 0 1 0.182 0.386 0 1 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Secondary  0.313 0.464 0 1 0.453 0.498 0 1 0.155 0.362 0 1 
College  0.074 0.263 0 1 0.142 0.349 0 1 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Graduate School 0.001 0.037 0 1 0.003 0.056 0 1 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Industry  0.297 0.457 0 1 0.179 0.384 0 1 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Construction  0.058 0.233 0 1 0.011 0.105 0 1 0.008 0.088 0 1 
Commerce  0.161 0.367 0 1 0.182 0.386 0 1 0.081 0.272 0 1 
Service  0.462 0.499 0 1 0.606 0.489 0 1 0.739 0.439 0 1 
Hour  43.066 7.398 3 98 40.213 7.769 1 98 39.577 8.325 2 98 
Observations 29,627 19,927 7,337 
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Table B3: Descriptive Statistics for employed Young Males, Young Females and Older Females after Policy 2A 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loghw 1.064 0.703 0 5.128 0.970 0.703 0 5.011 1.077 0.818 0 5.177 
Exp 21.288 7.387 4 40 19.337 7.477 4 40 40.572 8.123 24 65 
Exp squared  507.729 328.821 16 1600 429.839 315.767 16 1600 1712.046 687.265 576 4225 
PE 0.101 0.302 0 1 0.088 0.284 0 1 0.089 0.285 0 1 
BA 0.115 0.319 0 1 0.100 0.300 0 1 0.106 0.308 0 1 
MG 0.222 0.415 0 1 0.213 0.409 0 1 0.173 0.378 0 1 
RJ 0.153 0.360 0 1 0.155 0.362 0 1 0.176 0.381 0 1 
RS 0.172 0.377 0 1 0.190 0.392 0 1 0.223 0.416 0 1 
Lower primary 0.324 0.468 0 1 0.193 0.394 0 1 0.341 0.474 0 1 
Upper primary 0.237 0.425 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Secondary  0.339 0.473 0 1 0.469 0.499 0 1 0.169 0.374 0 1 
College  0.074 0.262 0 1 0.146 0.353 0 1 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Graduate School 0.003 0.055 0 1 0.005 0.067 0 1 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Industry  0.295 0.456 0 1 0.172 0.378 0 1 0.133 0.339 0 1 
Construction  0.054 0.226 0 1 0.011 0.104 0 1 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Commerce  0.160 0.367 0 1 0.179 0.384 0 1 0.081 0.274 0 1 
Service  0.467 0.499 0 1 0.615 0.487 0 1 0.734 0.442 0 1 
Hour  43.259 7.339 2 98 40.375 7.725 2 98 39.527 8.407 1 98 
Observations 118,128 80,357 30,839 
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Table B4: Descriptive Statistics for employed Young Males, Young Females and Older Females after Policy 2B 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loghw 1.081 0.702 0 5.234 1.004 0.706 0 5.011 1.457 0.825 0 5.298 
Exp 21.157 7.467 4 40 19.043 7.466 3 40 38.703 7.650 24 65 
Exp squared  503.369 331.566 16 1600 418.377 313.160 9 1600 1556.468 629.778 576 4225 
PE 0.104 0.305 0 1 0.091 0.287 0 1 0.087 0.281 0 1 
BA 0.109 0.312 0 1 0.100 0.300 0 1 0.112 0.316 0 1 
MG 0.218 0.413 0 1 0.209 0.407 0 1 0.168 0.374 0 1 
RJ 0.155 0.362 0 1 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.179 0.384 0 1 
RS 0.158 0.365 0 1 0.177 0.382 0 1 0.165 0.372 0 1 
Lower primary 0.295 0.456 0 1 0.168 0.374 0 1 0.217 0.413 0 1 
Upper primary 0.236 0.425 0 1 0.169 0.374 0 1 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Secondary  0.355 0.479 0 1 0.500 0.500 0 1 0.345 0.475 0 1 
College  0.073 0.260 0 1 0.143 0.350 0 1 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Graduate School 0.003 0.055 0 1 0.004 0.066 0 1 0.008 0.091 0 1 
Industry  0.288 0.453 0 1 0.180 0.384 0 1 0.164 0.370 0 1 
Construction  0.060 0.238 0 1 0.012 0.111 0 1 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Commerce  0.181 0.385 0 1 0.199 0.400 0 1 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Service  0.408 0.491 0 1 0.571 0.495 0 1 0.631 0.483 0 1 
Hour  43.711 7.637 1 120 40.758 7.776 1 120 40.859 7.742 2 120 
Observations 190,437 125,272 72,349 
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Table B5: Descriptive Statistics for employed Young Males, Young Females and Older Females after Policy 3 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loghw 1.304 0.670 0 5.521 1.260 0.677 0 5.234 1.113 0.828 0 5.177 
Exp 20.351 7.575 2 40 18.237 7.206 4 40 40.119 8.038 24 65 
Exp squared  471.545 329.791 4 1600 384.505 295.888 16 1600 1674.134 677.042 576 4225 
PE 0.107 0.310 0 1 0.103 0.303 0 1 0.095 0.293 0 1 
BA 0.119 0.324 0 1 0.117 0.322 0 1 0.106 0.307 0 1 
MG 0.208 0.406 0 1 0.196 0.397 0 1 0.177 0.382 0 1 
RJ 0.155 0.362 0 1 0.160 0.366 0 1 0.178 0.383 0 1 
RS 0.158 0.365 0 1 0.171 0.376 0 1 0.205 0.403 0 1 
Lower primary 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.103 0.304 0 1 0.315 0.464 0 1 
Upper primary 0.219 0.414 0 1 0.137 0.344 0 1 0.164 0.371 0 1 
Secondary  0.451 0.498 0 1 0.587 0.492 0 1 0.209 0.407 0 1 
College  0.078 0.267 0 1 0.152 0.359 0 1 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Graduate School 0.003 0.056 0 1 0.005 0.069 0 1 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Industry  0.283 0.451 0 1 0.184 0.387 0 1 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Construction  0.062 0.242 0 1 0.011 0.106 0 1 0.010 0.098 0 1 
Commerce  0.209 0.407 0 1 0.240 0.427 0 1 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Service  0.323 0.468 0 1 0.501 0.500 0 1 0.693 0.461 0 1 
Hour  44.301 7.070 1 120 41.767 7.140 1 120 39.929 8.413 1 120 
Observations 306,886 199,965 46,025 
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PNAD 
Table B6: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employed 0.923 0.267 0 1 0.858 0.349 0 1 0.936 0.245 0 1 
Age 29.728 6.025 20 40 29.688 6.054 20 40 48.556 6.026 41 65 
Age squared 920.055 361.508 400 1600 918.000 363.041 400 1600 2394.016 613.672 1681 4225 
Black 0.067 0.251 0 1 0.067 0.250 0 1 0.076 0.264 0 1 
Mixed 0.411 0.492 0 1 0.382 0.486 0 1 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Asian 0.003 0.053 0 1 0.004 0.060 0 1 0.005 0.068 0 1 
Native 0.002 0.042 0 1 0.002 0.042 0 1 0.002 0.045 0 1 
Migrant 0.181 0.385 0 1 0.179 0.384 0 1 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Years of schooling 7.133 4.109 0 15 8.561 4.066 0 15 6.767 4.877 0 15 
College 0.051 0.220 0 1 0.099 0.298 0 1 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Graduate school 0.003 0.051 0 1 0.004 0.059 0 1 0.008 0.088 0 1 
Urban 0.857 0.350 0 1 0.922 0.269 0 1 0.916 0.278 0 1 
Head of household 0.650 0.477 0 1 0.223 0.416 0 1 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Observations 320,789 234,510 109,616 
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Table B7 Descriptive Statistics for Young Males, Young Females and Older Females before change in Maternity Leave Policy 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 1997.0280 0.8091 1996 1998 1997.0430 0.8136 1996 1998 1997.0510 0.8109 1996 1998 
UF 35.7815 8.3453 17 53 35.8575 8.5176 17 53 35.4475 8.3512 17 53 
Age 29.7406 5.9101 20 40 29.8523 5.9319 20 40 47.3866 5.4483 41 65 
Headh 0.6707 0.4700 0 1 0.2053 0.4039 0 1 0.3799 0.4854 0 1 
White 0.5921 0.4914 0 1 0.6660 0.4717 0 1 0.6651 0.4720 0 1 
Black 0.0616 0.2404 0 1 0.0457 0.2088 0 1 0.0568 0.2314 0 1 
Mixed 0.3420 0.4744 0 1 0.2825 0.4502 0 1 0.2693 0.4436 0 1 
Asian 0.0028 0.0531 0 1 0.0045 0.0669 0 1 0.0069 0.0830 0 1 
Native 0.0014 0.0379 0 1 0.0014 0.0372 0 1 0.0019 0.0440 0 1 
Migrant 0.2060 0.4044 0 1 0.1772 0.3818 0 1 0.2320 0.4221 0 1 
Years of 
Schooling 
8.0724 3.8502 0 15 10.4309 3.4582 0 15 9.3967 4.6957 0 15 
College 0.0713 0.2572 0 1 0.1813 0.3853 0 1 0.2528 0.4347 0 1 
Graduate 
School 
0.0033 0.0577 0 1 0.0059 0.0768 0 1 0.0148 0.1209 0 1 
Employed 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 
Urban 0.9373 0.2424 0 1 0.9468 0.2244 0 1 0.9542 0.2090 0 1 
W 609.9001 672.1068 25 20000 511.5317 559.1702 20 10000 662.3658 772.7894 10 11000 
Hourlyw 3.7109 4.9719 1 208.3333 3.6439 4.6213 1 185.8333 4.8088 5.8271 1 112.5000 
Logw 6.1230 0.6882 3.2189 9.9035 5.9298 0.7207 2.9957 9.2103 6.0917 0.8491 2.3026 9.3057 
Loghw 0.9781 0.7166 0 5.3391 0.9630 0.7236 0 5.2249 1.1660 0.8343 0 4.7230 
Seniority 4.4973 4.7267 0 26 4.7356 4.7800 0 26 11.5155 8.4296 0 49 
Observations 62,609 37,549 14424 
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Table B8: Descriptive Statistics for Young Males, Young Females and Older Females for Policy 1 
Variable 
Young Males Young Females Older Females 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 2000.7800 1.2203 1999 2002 2000.8120 1.2091 1999 2002 2000.8270 1.2052 1999 2002 
UF 35.6314 8.7460 17 53 35.5972 8.8631 17 53 35.0051 8.6201 17 53 
Age 29.4937 5.9673 20 40 29.6008 6.0303 20 40 47.8301 5.5075 41 65 
Headh 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 
White 0.6451 0.4785 0 1 0.2155 0.4111 0 1 0.3883 0.4874 0 1 
Black 0.5592 0.4965 0 1 0.6357 0.4813 0 1 0.6343 0.4816 0 1 
Mixed 0.0658 0.2479 0 1 0.0484 0.2145 0 1 0.0598 0.2372 0 1 
Asian 0.3707 0.4830 0 1 0.3097 0.4624 0 1 0.2996 0.4581 0 1 
Native 0.0028 0.0532 0 1 0.0046 0.0679 0 1 0.0049 0.0701 0 1 
Migrant 0.0016 0.0395 0 1 0.0016 0.0402 0 1 0.0014 0.0374 0 1 
Years of Schooling 0.2009 0.4006 0 1 0.1700 0.3756 0 1 0.2251 0.4177 0 1 
College 8.3683 3.7949 0 15 10.5581 3.3177 0 15 9.3184 4.6385 0 15 
Graduate School 0.0669 0.2499 0 1 0.1667 0.3727 0 1 0.2333 0.4229 0 1 
Employed 0.0042 0.0648 0 1 0.0064 0.0799 0 1 0.0157 0.1242 0 1 
Urban 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 
W 0.9482 0.2216 0 1 0.9516 0.2147 0 1 0.9518 0.2142 0 1 
Hourlyw 635.2886 745.3737 20 20000 543.9732 626.9733 20 15000 741.1411 960.1788 20 20000 
Logw 3.8676 5.4495 1 250 3.8288 5.0782 1 250 5.3420 7.4159 1 208.3333 
Loghw 6.1490 0.6974 2.9957 9.9035 5.9896 0.7085 2.9957 9.6158 6.1793 0.8524 2.9957 9.9035 
Seniority 9.0265 86.1152 0 7000 22.6634 177.8334 0 16000 107.1749 389.2223 0 11600 
Observations 73,697 48,119 20,036 
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APPENDIX C: REGRESSIONS–FULL TABLES 
PME 
Wage Equation before Heckman’s Correction 
Table C1: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 1 only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.282 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Policy1 0.060 0.074 
 [0.004]*** [0.007]*** 
p1xfemale 0.019 - 
 [0.005]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.032 
 - [0.006]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 - 0.002 
 - [0.008] 
Exp 0.056 0.037 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.558 -0.544 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
BA -0.515 -0.484 
 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
MG -0.291 -0.292 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
RJ -0.347 -0.309 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
RS -0.262 -0.234 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Lower primary 0.201 0.226 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.525 0.616 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Secondary 1.014 0.980 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
College 1.894 1.795 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Graduate school 2.453 2.266 
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 [0.025]*** [0.029]*** 
Industry 0.043 -0.104 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Construction -0.029 0.040 
 [0.008]*** [0.016]*** 
Commerce -0.088 -0.202 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Service 0.015 -0.077 
 [0.007]** [0.009]*** 
Constant -0.232 -0.156 
 [0.011]*** [0.015]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 330,893 171,290 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C2: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 1 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.169 -0.208 -0.228 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Policy 1 0.059 0.061 0.058 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
p1xfemale 0.000 0.005 0.012 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]** 
Exp 0.022 0.033 0.039 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.407 -0.476 -0.505 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.390 -0.450 -0.472 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.222 -0.253 -0.267 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.246 -0.293 -0.314 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.199 -0.225 -0.237 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.160 0.187 0.198 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.370 0.449 0.483 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary  0.647 0.813 0.889 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College  1.114 1.396 1.551 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate School 1.440 1.675 1.840 
 [0.066]*** [0.042]*** [0.036]*** 
Industry -0.003 0.004 0.013 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]** 
Construction -0.041 -0.051 -0.046 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Commerce -0.096 -0.108 -0.105 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Service 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 272,883 301,248 312,858 
R-squared 0.26 0.34 0.38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C3: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 1 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 
 [0.005]* [0.005] [0.005] 
Policy 1 0.062 0.062 0.066 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 -0.006 -0.002 0.000 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Exp 0.017 0.024 0.028 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.395 -0.455 -0.483 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
BA -0.368 -0.416 -0.438 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
MG -0.244 -0.258 -0.269 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
RJ -0.238 -0.267 -0.283 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
RS -0.189 -0.204 -0.212 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.177 0.209 0.221 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.439 0.532 0.571 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Secondary  0.686 0.835 0.897 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
College  1.153 1.411 1.546 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Graduate School 1.436 1.653 1.803 
 [0.051]*** [0.037]*** [0.032]*** 
Industry -0.091 -0.100 -0.101 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Construction 0.021 0.026 0.042 
 [0.013] [0.014]* [0.014]*** 
Commerce -0.148 -0.171 -0.179 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Service -0.044 -0.054 -0.058 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144,065 157,420 163,118 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C4: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 2A only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.280 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Policy2A 0.031 0.060 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale 0.023 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.034 
 - [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale20to40 - -0.014 
 - [0.005]*** 
Exp 0.057 0.035 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.554 -0.542 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.505 -0.475 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.296 -0.305 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.321 -0.296 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.243 -0.221 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.190 0.214 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.499 0.593 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.975 0.951 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.882 1.794 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 2.425 2.315 
 [0.018]*** [0.022]*** 
Industry 0.020 -0.108 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Construction -0.044 0.036 
 [0.006]*** [0.013]*** 
Commerce -0.114 -0.212 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
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Service -0.003 -0.080 
 [0.005] [0.007]*** 
Constant -0.201 -0.114 
 [0.009]*** [0.013]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 479,824 255,222 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C5: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 2A only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.167 -0.206 -0.227 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Policy 2A 0.045 0.036 0.034 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
p2Axfemale 0.001 0.011 0.014 
 [0.003] [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Exp 0.024 0.034 0.040 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.406 -0.474 -0.502 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.383 -0.442 -0.464 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.226 -0.259 -0.272 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.224 -0.270 -0.290 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.181 -0.206 -0.218 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.156 0.182 0.191 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.358 0.433 0.465 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary  0.628 0.786 0.860 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College  1.112 1.388 1.541 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate School 1.403 1.655 1.817 
 [0.049]*** [0.032]*** [0.027]*** 
Industry -0.020 -0.015 -0.006 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005] 
Construction -0.050 -0.061 -0.056 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Commerce -0.113 -0.127 -0.127 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 
 [0.005]** [0.005]*** [0.005]** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 396,865 437,039 453,773 
R-squared 0.26 0.34 0.38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C6: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 2A only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]** [0.005] 
Policy 2A 0.053 0.049 0.051 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale20to40 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
Exp 0.016 0.023 0.026 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.393 -0.453 -0.481 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.363 -0.411 -0.431 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.253 -0.273 -0.284 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.224 -0.255 -0.270 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.177 -0.190 -0.197 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.169 0.200 0.210 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.418 0.510 0.547 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary  0.665 0.811 0.870 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College  1.141 1.399 1.535 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate School 1.400 1.647 1.814 
 [0.042]*** [0.031]*** [0.026]*** 
Industry -0.100 -0.110 -0.110 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Construction 0.014 0.020 0.035 
 [0.011] [0.011]* [0.012]*** 
Commerce -0.162 -0.187 -0.196 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Service -0.051 -0.061 -0.065 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 214,286 234,101 242,578 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C7: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.280 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Policy2B 0.087 0.116 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.040 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.026 
 - [0.005]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 - 0.009 
 - [0.005]** 
Exp 0.060 0.036 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.545 -0.538 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.490 -0.461 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.296 -0.311 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.300 -0.281 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.226 -0.213 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.169 0.196 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.463 0.551 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.935 0.920 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.870 1.791 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 2.456 2.367 
 [0.016]*** [0.019]*** 
Industry -0.003 -0.107 
 [0.004] [0.006]*** 
Construction -0.064 0.018 
 [0.005]*** [0.011]* 
Commerce -0.133 -0.204 
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 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
Service -0.024 -0.073 
 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
Constant -0.177 -0.113 
 [0.007]*** [0.011]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 597,048 315,323 
R-squared 0.47 0.50 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C8: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.164 -0.203 -0.225 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Policy 2B 0.090 0.083 0.079 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.016 0.023 0.028 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Exp 0.026 0.036 0.042 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.403 -0.467 -0.494 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
BA -0.376 -0.431 -0.452 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
MG -0.227 -0.259 -0.272 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.210 -0.251 -0.269 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.169 -0.191 -0.202 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.135 0.159 0.167 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.328 0.399 0.428 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary  0.593 0.745 0.817 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College  1.076 1.351 1.505 
 [0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Graduate School 1.381 1.665 1.829 
 [0.048]*** [0.031]*** [0.025]*** 
Industry -0.045 -0.037 -0.026 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.070 -0.077 -0.073 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Commerce -0.132 -0.144 -0.142 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.033 -0.034 -0.030 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 491,843 542,589 563,505 
R-squared 0.26 0.33 0.37 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C9: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Policy 2B 0.100 0.090 0.092 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 0.004 0.008 0.009 
 [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** 
Exp 0.017 0.023 0.027 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.392 -0.448 -0.475 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.358 -0.401 -0.418 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.255 -0.275 -0.285 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.211 -0.240 -0.254 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.167 -0.181 -0.187 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.155 0.182 0.192 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.391 0.475 0.510 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary  0.640 0.780 0.838 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College  1.117 1.375 1.512 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate School 1.387 1.665 1.832 
 [0.042]*** [0.030]*** [0.025]*** 
Industry -0.098 -0.106 -0.110 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Construction 0.001 0.011 0.019 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]* 
Commerce -0.155 -0.176 -0.187 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.045 -0.052 -0.058 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 263,026 287,821 298,514 
R-squared 0.31 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C10: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 3 only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.270 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Policy3 0.234 0.159 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]*** 
p3xfemale 0.080 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Female20to40 - 0.005 
 - [0.005] 
p3xfemale20to40 - 0.036 
 - [0.004]*** 
Exp 0.056 0.037 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.496 -0.511 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.414 -0.408 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.244 -0.279 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.251 -0.261 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.143 -0.165 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.139 0.171 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.402 0.470 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.831 0.856 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
College 1.810 1.758 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 2.475 2.487 
 [0.013]*** [0.015]*** 
Industry -0.014 -0.090 
 [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.063 0.056 
 [0.003]*** [0.009]*** 
Commerce -0.151 -0.190 
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 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.051 -0.066 
 [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Constant -0.083 -0.139 
 [0.006]*** [0.009]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 788,190 420,536 
R-squared 0.48 0.54 
Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C11: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 3 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.146 -0.185 -0.207 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Policy 3 0.219 0.225 0.224 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p3xfemale 0.054 0.053 0.058 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Exp 0.021 0.030 0.036 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.345 -0.409 -0.436 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
BA -0.304 -0.354 -0.373 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
MG -0.181 -0.208 -0.218 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.170 -0.202 -0.217 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.104 -0.115 -0.120 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.106 0.131 0.139 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.270 0.340 0.368 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Secondary  0.491 0.640 0.709 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
College  0.930 1.205 1.363 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Graduate School 1.168 1.475 1.713 
 [0.046]*** [0.028]*** [0.024]*** 
Industry -0.046 -0.050 -0.041 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Construction -0.048 -0.072 -0.071 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Commerce -0.126 -0.155 -0.155 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Service -0.043 -0.059 -0.056 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 611,232 698,481 731,514 
R-squared 0.27 0.32 0.36 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C12: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 3 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 0.020 0.014 0.012 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Policy 3 0.149 0.183 0.181 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p3xfemale20to40 0.017 0.031 0.037 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Exp 0.013 0.021 0.025 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.332 -0.397 -0.426 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.282 -0.335 -0.355 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.202 -0.233 -0.245 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.171 -0.204 -0.220 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.107 -0.126 -0.131 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.133 0.158 0.166 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.334 0.401 0.431 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary  0.540 0.687 0.748 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College  0.984 1.232 1.370 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate School 1.300 1.557 1.743 
 [0.040]*** [0.027]*** [0.023]*** 
Industry -0.106 -0.099 -0.107 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.015 0.018 0.027 
 [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]*** 
Commerce -0.159 -0.165 -0.176 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Service -0.066 -0.054 -0.058 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 322,554 364,651 383,338 
R-squared 0.33 0.39 0.43 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Wage Equation after Heckman’s Correction 
Table C13: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 1 only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.170 - 
 [0.004]*** - 
Policy1 0.079 0.078 
 [0.004]*** [0.007]*** 
p1xfemale 0.010 - 
 [0.005]** - 
Female20to40 - -0.028 
 - [0.006]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 - 0.001 
 - [0.008] 
Exp 0.051 0.035 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.536 -0.534 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
BA -0.506 -0.481 
 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
MG -0.298 -0.295 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
RJ -0.341 -0.305 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
RS -0.266 -0.235 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Lower primary 0.177 0.232 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.485 0.619 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Secondary 0.941 0.968 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
College 1.766 1.770 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Graduate school 2.316 2.233 
 [0.026]*** [0.029]*** 
Industry 0.043 -0.104 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Construction -0.034 0.039 
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 [0.008]*** [0.016]** 
Commerce -0.088 -0.203 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Service 0.014 -0.078 
 [0.007]** [0.009]*** 
Constant -0.045 -0.080 
 [0.012]*** [0.019]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.226 -0.072 
 [0.007]*** [0.011]*** 
Observations 330,893 171,290 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C14: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 1 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.054 -0.073 -0.090 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Policy1 0.079 0.083 0.081 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
p1xfemale -0.009 -0.005 0.002 
 [0.004]** [0.005] [0.005] 
Exp 0.016 0.026 0.032 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.384 -0.449 -0.477 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.380 -0.438 -0.460 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.229 -0.261 -0.275 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.239 -0.285 -0.305 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.202 -0.229 -0.241 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.136 0.159 0.169 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.330 0.402 0.434 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.573 0.726 0.799 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
College 0.976 1.236 1.388 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Graduate school 1.290 1.500 1.661 
 [0.065]*** [0.042]*** [0.036]*** 
Industry -0.004 0.004 0.012 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]** 
Construction -0.047 -0.058 -0.053 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Commerce -0.096 -0.109 -0.106 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Service -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.225 -0.268 -0.277 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
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Observations 272,883 301,248 312,858 
R-squared 0.27 0.34 0.38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table C15: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 1 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 
 [0.005]* [0.005] [0.005] 
Policy1 0.063 0.064 0.068 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 -0.007 -0.002 -0.000 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Exp 0.017 0.023 0.026 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.393 -0.450 -0.476 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
BA -0.368 -0.415 -0.436 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
MG -0.244 -0.259 -0.271 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
RJ -0.238 -0.265 -0.280 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
RS -0.190 -0.204 -0.212 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.178 0.212 0.225 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Upper primary 0.440 0.534 0.573 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Secondary 0.684 0.830 0.890 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
College 1.149 1.398 1.531 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Graduate school 1.430 1.636 1.782 
 [0.051]*** [0.037]*** [0.032]*** 
Industry -0.091 -0.100 -0.101 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Construction 0.021 0.025 0.041 
 [0.013] [0.014]* [0.014]*** 
Commerce -0.148 -0.172 -0.179 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Service -0.045 -0.054 -0.058 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.011 -0.036 -0.046 
 [0.009] [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
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Observations 144,065 157,420 163,118 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C16: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 2A only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.175 - 
 [0.004]*** - 
Policy2A 0.045 0.061 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale 0.013 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.030 
 - [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale20to40 - -0.014 
 - [0.005]*** 
Exp 0.052 0.034 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.531 -0.534 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.493 -0.472 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.301 -0.307 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.314 -0.293 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.246 -0.222 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.165 0.219 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.459 0.595 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.903 0.942 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.755 1.773 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Graduate school 2.286 2.288 
 [0.019]*** [0.022]*** 
Industry 0.020 -0.108 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Construction -0.048 0.035 
 [0.006]*** [0.013]*** 
Commerce -0.114 -0.212 
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 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Service -0.004 -0.081 
 [0.005] [0.007]*** 
Constant -0.018 -0.052 
 [0.010]* [0.016]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.215 -0.057 
 [0.006]*** [0.009]*** 
Observations 479,824 255,222 
R-squared 0.48 0.49 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C17: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 2A only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.057 -0.077 -0.092 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Policy2A 0.060 0.053 0.051 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
p2Axfemale -0.009 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.003]*** [0.003] [0.003] 
Exp 0.018 0.027 0.033 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.382 -0.446 -0.473 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.371 -0.428 -0.449 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.231 -0.265 -0.278 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.215 -0.260 -0.280 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.184 -0.210 -0.222 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.131 0.152 0.160 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.318 0.386 0.415 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.553 0.698 0.768 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College 0.974 1.228 1.376 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 1.244 1.473 1.625 
 [0.049]*** [0.032]*** [0.027]*** 
Industry -0.020 -0.016 -0.007 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005] 
Construction -0.056 -0.067 -0.063 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Commerce -0.114 -0.128 -0.128 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.011 -0.016 -0.014 
 [0.005]** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.216 -0.256 -0.269 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
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Observations 396,865 437,039 453,773 
R-squared 0.27 0.34 0.38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C18: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 2A only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]* [0.005] 
Policy2A 0.053 0.049 0.052 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
p2Axfemale20to40 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]** [0.005]** 
Exp 0.016 0.022 0.025 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.393 -0.449 -0.476 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.363 -0.410 -0.429 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.253 -0.274 -0.285 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.224 -0.253 -0.268 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.177 -0.190 -0.197 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.169 0.201 0.212 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.418 0.511 0.549 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.664 0.807 0.864 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.141 1.389 1.523 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 1.400 1.634 1.797 
 [0.042]*** [0.031]*** [0.026]*** 
Industry -0.100 -0.110 -0.110 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Construction 0.014 0.020 0.035 
 [0.011] [0.011]* [0.012]*** 
Commerce -0.162 -0.187 -0.196 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Service -0.051 -0.061 -0.065 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.001 -0.026 -0.035 
 [0.007] [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
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Observations 214,286 234,101 242,578 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C19: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.173 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Policy2B 0.107 0.116 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
p2B xfemale 0.025 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.023 
 - [0.005]*** 
p2B xfemale20to40 - 0.009 
 - [0.005]** 
Exp 0.054 0.034 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.522 -0.528 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.478 -0.460 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.299 -0.312 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.292 -0.277 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.230 -0.214 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.142 0.199 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.421 0.553 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Secondary 0.858 0.909 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.739 1.766 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 2.310 2.335 
 [0.017]*** [0.020]*** 
Industry -0.002 -0.107 
 [0.004] [0.006]*** 
Construction -0.067 0.017 
 [0.005]*** [0.011]* 
Commerce -0.132 -0.204 
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 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
Service -0.024 -0.073 
 [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
Constant 0.011 -0.042 
 [0.009] [0.014]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.217 -0.065 
 [0.005]*** [0.008]*** 
Observations 597,048 315,323 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 
Robust standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C20: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.056 -0.075 -0.091 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Policy2B 0.111 0.107 0.105 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.001 0.005 0.009 
 [0.002] [0.002]** [0.003]*** 
Exp 0.020 0.029 0.035 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.379 -0.438 -0.464 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
BA -0.363 -0.417 -0.436 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
MG -0.230 -0.263 -0.275 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.201 -0.241 -0.258 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.172 -0.196 -0.206 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.109 0.128 0.134 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.286 0.349 0.376 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.516 0.654 0.722 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College 0.938 1.189 1.338 
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 1.222 1.480 1.636 
 [0.048]*** [0.031]*** [0.025]*** 
Industry -0.044 -0.036 -0.025 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.074 -0.082 -0.077 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Commerce -0.132 -0.143 -0.142 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.033 -0.034 -0.030 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.212 -0.254 -0.266 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
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Observations 491,843 542,589 563,505 
R-squared 0.26 0.34 0.38 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C21: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Policy2B 0.100 0.090 0.093 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 0.004 0.008 0.009 
 [0.004] [0.004]** [0.004]** 
Exp 0.017 0.023 0.026 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.392 -0.445 -0.469 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
BA -0.358 -0.400 -0.417 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
MG -0.255 -0.276 -0.286 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RJ -0.211 -0.238 -0.252 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.167 -0.181 -0.188 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Lower primary 0.154 0.184 0.193 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.391 0.476 0.511 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.641 0.776 0.832 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
College 1.118 1.366 1.500 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 1.389 1.652 1.814 
 [0.042]*** [0.031]*** [0.025]*** 
Industry -0.098 -0.106 -0.110 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Construction 0.001 0.011 0.018 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]* 
Commerce -0.155 -0.176 -0.187 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.045 -0.052 -0.058 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.003 -0.024 -0.034 
 [0.007] [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
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Observations 263,026 287,821 298,514 
R-squared 0.31 0.38 0.42 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C22: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages, Policy 3 only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.169 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Policy3 0.253 0.158 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]*** 
p3xfemale 0.051 - 
 [0.003]*** - 
Female20to40 - 0.007 
 - [0.005] 
p3xfemale20to40 - 0.037 
 - [0.004]*** 
Exp 0.051 0.036 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.469 -0.503 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.401 -0.406 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.246 -0.280 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.245 -0.259 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
RS -0.147 -0.165 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.111 0.172 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Upper primary 0.359 0.470 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.755 0.849 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College 1.683 1.741 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 2.332 2.463 
 [0.014]*** [0.015]*** 
Industry -0.012 -0.090 
 [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.065 0.057 
 [0.003]*** [0.009]*** 
Commerce -0.149 -0.189 
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 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.050 -0.066 
 [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Constant 0.102 -0.093 
 [0.008]*** [0.013]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.205 -0.043 
 [0.005]*** [0.009]*** 
Observations 788,190 420,536 
R-squared 0.48 0.54 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C23: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using young males as a control group, Policy 3 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.052 -0.064 -0.079 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Policy3 0.237 0.248 0.248 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p3xfemale 0.027 0.019 0.023 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Exp 0.015 0.023 0.029 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.320 -0.377 -0.402 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
BA -0.291 -0.337 -0.355 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
MG -0.184 -0.210 -0.221 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.165 -0.195 -0.209 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.108 -0.119 -0.125 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.081 0.099 0.104 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.232 0.290 0.314 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Secondary 0.420 0.549 0.612 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
College 0.808 1.049 1.198 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 1.027 1.293 1.519 
 [0.046]*** [0.028]*** [0.024]*** 
Industry -0.045 -0.049 -0.040 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Construction -0.050 -0.075 -0.073 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Commerce -0.126 -0.153 -0.154 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Service -0.043 -0.059 -0.055 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.182 -0.238 -0.255 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
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Observations 611,232 698,481 731,514 
R-squared 0.27 0.33 0.36 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table C24: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ hourly 
wages by wage levels using older females as a control group, Policy 3 only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 0.021 0.015 0.014 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Policy3 0.149 0.181 0.179 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p3xfemale20to40 0.017 0.032 0.038 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Exp 0.013 0.020 0.023 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.330 -0.392 -0.417 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
BA -0.282 -0.333 -0.353 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
MG -0.202 -0.233 -0.245 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.171 -0.202 -0.217 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
RS -0.107 -0.126 -0.132 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.133 0.159 0.167 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Upper primary 0.334 0.401 0.431 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Secondary 0.539 0.682 0.740 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
College 0.981 1.220 1.351 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 1.296 1.539 1.716 
 [0.040]*** [0.027]*** [0.024]*** 
Industry -0.106 -0.099 -0.107 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Construction -0.015 0.018 0.027 
 [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]*** 
Commerce -0.159 -0.165 -0.176 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Service -0.066 -0.054 -0.058 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.007 -0.032 -0.050 
 [0.007] [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
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Observations 322,554 364,651 383,338 
R-squared 0.33 0.39 0.43 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Employment Equation 
Table C25: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ 
employment, Policy 1 only 
Employed 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Head of Household 0.220 0.195 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Female -0.262 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Policy1 -0.073 -0.032 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p1xfemale 0.040 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.030 
 - [0.002]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 - 0.005 
 - [0.003]* 
Exp 0.011 0.016 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.094 -0.098 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
BA -0.052 -0.031 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
MG 0.032 0.030 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
RJ -0.027 -0.040 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
RS 0.008 0.014 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Lower primary 0.072 -0.049 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Upper primary 0.115 -0.026 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Secondary  0.209 0.107 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
College  0.288 0.246 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Graduate school 0.271 0.311 
 [0.003]*** [0.011]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
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Observations 1,134,643 1,018,352 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C26: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ 
employment, Policy 2A only 
Employed 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Head of Household 0.217 0.188 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Female -0.265 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Policy2A -0.055 -0.019 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
p2Axfemale 0.034 - 
 [0.002]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.030 
 - [0.002]*** 
p2Axfemale20to40 - 0.001 
 - [0.002] 
Exp 0.012 0.017 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.098 -0.100 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
BA -0.058 -0.034 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
MG 0.025 0.027 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RJ -0.032 -0.044 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RS 0.008 0.013 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lower primary 0.081 -0.044 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Upper primary 0.124 -0.024 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Secondary  0.224 0.110 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
College  0.297 0.250 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Graduate school 0.280 0.318 
 [0.002]*** [0.008]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1,631,169 1,474,593 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C27: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ 
employment, Policy 2B only 
Employed 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Head of Household 0.208 0.178 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Female -0.272 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Policy2B -0.084 -0.030 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
p2B xfemale 0.046 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.027 
 - [0.002]*** 
p2B xfemale20to40 - 0.003 
 - [0.002]* 
Exp 0.012 0.016 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.099 -0.099 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
BA -0.058 -0.031 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
MG 0.019 0.023 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RJ -0.032 -0.039 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RS 0.012 0.017 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lower primary 0.083 -0.035 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Upper primary 0.126 -0.018 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Secondary  0.232 0.113 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
College  0.303 0.257 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Graduate school 0.288 0.333 
 [0.002]*** [0.007]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,000,808 1,810,580 
Standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table C28: PME: Effects of change in maternity leave policy on young females‘ 
employment, Policy 3 only 
Employed 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Head of Household 0.173 0.150 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Female -0.282 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Policy3 -0.067 -0.982 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
p3xfemale 0.070 - 
 [0.001]*** - 
Female20to40 - -0.027 
 - [0.002]*** 
p3xfemale20to40 - -0.001 
 - [0.001] 
Exp 0.015 0.015 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Exp squared -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
PE -0.107 -0.118 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
BA -0.060 -0.046 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
MG 0.015 0.008 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RJ -0.023 -0.038 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
RS 0.014 0.004 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Lower primary 0.092 -0.018 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Upper primary 0.137 -0.009 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Secondary  0.253 0.098 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College  0.304 0.254 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** 
Graduate school 0.286 0.349 
 [0.001]*** [0.005]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,454,140 2,246,240 
Standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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PNAD 
Wage Equation before Heckman’s Correction 
Table C29: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.257 - 
 [0.004]*** - 
Policy2B 0.008 0.077 
 [0.004]* [0.008]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.035 - 
 [0.005]*** - 
female20to40 - 0.050 
 - [0.008]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 - -0.043 
 - [0.007]*** 
Age 0.076 0.032 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Age squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.145 -0.146 
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** 
Mixed -0.110 -0.113 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Asian 0.109 0.117 
 [0.023]*** [0.027]*** 
Native -0.076 -0.048 
 [0.029]*** [0.038] 
Migrant 0.065 0.046 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of schooling 0.069 0.073 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
College 0.483 0.439 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 0.947 0.833 
 [0.022]*** [0.022]*** 
Federal 0.336 0.440 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
State 0.042 0.014 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]** 
Municipal -0.092 -0.047 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.023 0.018 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.107 -0.131 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
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Service -0.041 -0.045 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
Others 0.054 0.025 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Urban 0.075 0.071 
 [0.004]*** [0.007]*** 
Constant -1.231 -0.848 
 [0.032]*** [0.027]*** 
Observations 221,974 120,128 
R-squared 0.48 0.52 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C30: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using young males as a control group by 
wage levels, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.157 -0.194 -0.213 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Policy1 0.041 0.011 0.044 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p1xfemale 0.026 0.031 0.033 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Age  0.054 0.069 0.074 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Age Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.087 -0.108 -0.119 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Mixed -0.058 -0.077 -0.086 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Asian 0.049 0.048 0.089 
 [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.021]*** 
Native -0.045 -0.055 -0.061 
 [0.024]* [0.026]** [0.027]** 
Migrant 0.036 0.044 0.047 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Years of Schooling 0.044 0.054 0.059 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
College  0.238 0.280 0.317 
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate School 0.402 0.503 0.590 
 [0.047]*** [0.033]*** [0.030]*** 
Federal 0.195 0.249 0.272 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
State 0.081 0.078 0.074 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Municipal -0.037 -0.056 -0.066 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.016 0.020 0.021 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.075 -0.088 -0.095 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Service -0.009 -0.020 -0.026 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Others 0.101 0.092 0.082 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Urban 0.055 0.070 0.074 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Constant -0.705 -0.992 -1.107 
 [0.028]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** 
Observations 185,485 203,776 210,894 
115 
 
 
R-squared 0.28 0.36 0.39 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C31: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control group by 
wage levels, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 0.039 0.050 0.052 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Policy1 0.057 0.102 0.069 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 -0.031 -0.032 -0.035 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Age  0.015 0.022 0.025 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.088 -0.105 -0.119 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Mixed -0.061 -0.079 -0.089 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Asian 0.057 0.069 0.113 
 [0.028]** [0.026]*** [0.025]*** 
Native 0.002 -0.018 -0.026 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.036] 
Migrant 0.023 0.029 0.031 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of Schooling 0.053 0.062 0.066 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College  0.228 0.281 0.316 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate School 0.387 0.502 0.562 
 [0.039]*** [0.029]*** [0.026]*** 
Federal 0.226 0.295 0.332 
 [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
State 0.068 0.053 0.042 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Municipal 0.001 -0.017 -0.026 
 [0.005] [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.013 0.015 0.016 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.069 -0.087 -0.101 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.005 -0.018 -0.024 
 [0.005] [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Others 0.094 0.082 0.068 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Urban 0.058 0.070 0.073 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Constant -0.409 -0.604 -0.697 
 [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** 
Observations 99,427 109,368 113,527 
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R-squared 0.35 0.42 0.45 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C32: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using young males as a control group by 
child‘s age, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Without 
children 
age≤1 
age >1 and 
age≤2 
age >2 and 
age≤6 
age >6 and 
age≤10 
Female -0.245 -0.208 -0.236 -0.257 -0.302 
 [0.005]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Policy1 0.010 0.011 0.058 0.057 0.012 
 [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]** 
p1xfemale 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.039 0.044 
 [0.006]*** [0.013]*** [0.016]** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** 
Age  0.070 0.079 0.080 0.079 0.083 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Age Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.147 -0.140 -0.140 -0.139 -0.137 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Mixed -0.111 -0.108 -0.106 -0.107 -0.106 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Asian 0.079 0.067 0.053 0.086 0.086 
 [0.025]*** [0.031]** [0.031]* [0.030]*** [0.030]*** 
Native -0.102 -0.067 -0.086 -0.089 -0.068 
 [0.031]*** [0.037]* [0.036]** [0.034]*** [0.035]** 
Migrant 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.069 0.070 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of Schooling 0.069 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
College  0.493 0.541 0.543 0.536 0.535 
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** 
Graduate School 0.980 1.045 1.039 1.000 1.029 
 [0.025]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]*** 
Federal 0.308 0.297 0.296 0.307 0.305 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
State 0.059 0.051 0.054 0.050 0.049 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Municipal -0.102 -0.137 -0.142 -0.126 -0.131 
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Seniority 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.111 -0.094 -0.095 -0.095 -0.093 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.041 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.040 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Others 0.059 0.066 0.068 0.061 0.062 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Urban 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.078 0.082 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Constant -1.172 -1.306 -1.323 -1.295 -1.363 
 [0.037]*** [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** 
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Observations 174,762 143,530 140,627 151,705 146,992 
R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C33: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control group by 
child‘s age, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Without 
children 
age≤1 
age >1 and 
age≤2 
age >2 and 
age≤6 
age >6 and 
age≤10 
Female20 to 40 0.080 0.112 0.073 0.064  
 [0.019]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]*** [0.012]*** 0.033 
Policy1 0.139 0.137 0.135 0.070 [0.013]** 
 [0.018]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 -0.044 -0.042 -0.052 -0.041 -0.039 
 [0.017]** [0.014]*** [0.017]*** [0.010]*** [0.012]*** 
Age  0.035 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.023 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.161 -0.139 -0.139 -0.134 -0.130 
 [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** 
Mixed -0.121 -0.113 -0.107 -0.112 -0.107 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Asian 0.062 0.049 0.027 0.085 0.084 
 [0.038]* [0.044] [0.045] [0.043]** [0.043]* 
Native -0.163 0.039 -0.010 -0.038 0.024 
 [0.054]*** [0.070] [0.064] [0.057] [0.057] 
Migrant 0.058 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.033 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Years of 
Schooling 
0.078 0.074 0.074 0.073 0.074 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College  0.401 0.444 0.439 0.449 0.436 
 [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
Graduate School 0.818 0.829 0.812 0.797 0.808 
 [0.036]*** [0.029]*** [0.030]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]*** 
Federal 0.375 0.465 0.471 0.472 0.474 
 [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** 
State 0.056 -0.029 -0.028 -0.017 -0.020 
 [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]** [0.009]** 
Municipal -0.027 -0.058 -0.058 -0.054 -0.054 
 [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Seniority 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.170 -0.101 -0.097 -0.108 -0.087 
 [0.008]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** 
Service -0.045 -0.075 -0.077 -0.067 -0.059 
 [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
Others 0.031 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 
 [0.008]*** [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] 
Urban 0.090 0.087 0.087 0.067 0.080 
 [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** 
Constant -1.012 -0.909 -0.790 -0.753 -0.669 
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 [0.047]*** [0.073]*** [0.086]*** [0.057]*** [0.084]*** 
Observations 43,882 41,684 38,781 49,859 45,146 
R-squared 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C34: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on females‘ hourly wages in the private sector using females in the public 
sector as a control group, Policy 2B only 
Loghw 
Control Group 
Females – public 
sector 
Young Females – 
public sector 
Older Females – 
public sector 
Femalep 0.009 - - 
 [0.006] - - 
Policy2 0.098 0.094 0.109 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** [0.014]*** 
p2Bxfemalep -0.096 - - 
 [0.007]*** - - 
female20to40p - 0.000 - 
 - [0.007] - 
p2Bxfemale20to40p - -0.097 - 
 - [0.008]*** - 
female41to65p - - 0.026 
 - - [0.012]** 
p2Bxfemale41to65p - - -0.088 
 - - [0.013]*** 
Age 0.032 0.062 -0.003 
 [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.010] 
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000] 
Black -0.147 -0.153 -0.134 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.013]*** 
Mixed -0.118 -0.119 -0.112 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** 
Asian 0.134 0.174 0.022 
 [0.027]*** [0.033]*** [0.045] 
Native -0.041 -0.054 0.012 
 [0.038] [0.046] [0.070] 
Migrant 0.059 0.061 0.046 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.009]*** 
Years of schooling 0.075 0.073 0.077 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College 0.449 0.447 0.450 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]*** 
Graduate school 0.888 0.881 0.901 
 [0.022]*** [0.031]*** [0.033]*** 
Seniority 0.019 0.023 0.017 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.140 -0.137 -0.104 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.015]*** 
Service -0.055 -0.038 -0.095 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.012]*** 
Others 0.001 0.028 -0.068 
 [0.005] [0.006]*** [0.010]*** 
Urban 0.093 0.092 0.107 
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 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.014]*** 
Constant -0.846 -1.253 -0.058 
 [0.026]*** [0.053]*** [0.262] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 120,128 85,668 31,200 
R-squared 0.50 0.47 0.54 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Wage Equation after Heckman’s Correction 
Table C35: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Control group 
Young Males Older Females 
Female -0.224 - 
 [0.004]*** - 
Policy2B 0.014 0.079 
 [0.004]*** [0.008]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.033 - 
 [0.005]*** - 
Female20to40 - 0.051 
 - [0.008]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 - -0.043 
 - [0.007]*** 
Age 0.063 0.027 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
Age squared -0.001 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.149 -0.151 
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** 
Mixed -0.112 -0.115 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Asian 0.133 0.122 
 [0.023]*** [0.027]*** 
Native -0.084 -0.056 
 [0.029]*** [0.038] 
Migrant 0.062 0.048 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of schooling 0.063 0.068 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
College 0.468 0.438 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 0.921 0.825 
 [0.022]*** [0.022]*** 
Federal 0.336 0.440 
 [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
State 0.042 0.015 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Municipal -0.088 -0.046 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.023 0.018 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.107 -0.131 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.040 -0.046 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
Others 0.057 0.026 
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 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Urban 0.060 0.066 
 [0.005]*** [0.007]*** 
Constant -0.866 -0.680 
 [0.034]*** [0.044]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
State Dummies Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.160 -0.057 
 [0.005]*** [0.012]*** 
Observations 221,974 120,128 
R-squared 0.48 0.52 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C36: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly using young males as a control group wages by 
wage levels, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female -0.136 -0.170 -0.186 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Policy2B 0.065 0.044 0.073 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.025 0.029 0.032 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Age 0.037 0.048 0.052 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.065 -0.082 -0.091 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Mixed -0.047 -0.063 -0.072 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Asian 0.063 0.065 0.105 
 [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** 
Native -0.027 -0.035 -0.039 
 [0.025] [0.026] [0.027] 
Migrant 0.032 0.039 0.041 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Years of schooling 0.038 0.048 0.052 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
College 0.222 0.261 0.298 
 [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 0.375 0.470 0.555 
 [0.047]*** [0.033]*** [0.030]*** 
Federal 0.195 0.250 0.273 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
State 0.082 0.079 0.074 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Municipal -0.035 -0.054 -0.063 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.015 0.019 0.021 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.075 -0.087 -0.094 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Service -0.008 -0.020 -0.026 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Others 0.103 0.094 0.085 
 [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Urban 0.078 0.096 0.102 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Constant -0.342 -0.552 -0.634 
 [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.034]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
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Inverse Mills Ratio -0.355 -0.427 -0.459 
 [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** 
Observations 185,485 203,776 210,894 
R-squared 0.29 0.36 0.40 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table C37: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control group by 
wage levels, Policy 2B only 
loghw w≤800 w≤1200 w≤1600 
Female20to40 0.052 0.055 0.055 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Policy2B 0.089 0.049 0.046 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
p2Bxfemale20to40 -0.034 -0.037 -0.037 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Age 0.029 0.034 0.037 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.122 -0.140 -0.152 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Mixed -0.089 -0.100 -0.108 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Asian 0.067 0.110 0.106 
 [0.026]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** 
Native -0.018 -0.026 -0.045 
 [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] 
Migrant 0.027 0.028 0.031 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of schooling 0.069 0.075 0.079 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College 0.276 0.311 0.347 
 [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** 
Graduate school 0.501 0.561 0.631 
 [0.029]*** [0.026]*** [0.024]*** 
Federal 0.294 0.330 0.351 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
State 0.052 0.041 0.028 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Municipal -0.017 -0.025 -0.032 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Seniority 0.015 0.016 0.017 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.087 -0.101 -0.108 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Service -0.020 -0.026 -0.031 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Others 0.083 0.069 0.058 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Urban 0.048 0.046 0.044 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Constant -0.840 -0.989 -1.093 
 [0.038]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes  
State Dummies Yes Yes  
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Inverse Mills Ratio 0.154 0.190 0.218 
 [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.020]*** 
Observations 109,368 113,527 116,206 
R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
130 
 
 
Table C38: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using young males as a control group by 
child‘s age, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Without 
children 
age≤1 
age >1 and 
age≤2 
age >2 and 
age≤6 
age >6 and 
age≤10 
Female -0.205 -0.167 -0.196 -0.219 -0.255 
 [0.005]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** [0.007]*** [0.009]*** 
Policy1 0.047 0.038 0.081 0.080 0.040 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
p1xfemale 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.041 
 [0.006]*** [0.013]*** [0.016]** [0.009]*** [0.011]*** 
Age  0.051 0.055 0.057 0.052 0.057 
 [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Age Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black -0.120 -0.121 -0.121 -0.118 -0.116 
 [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** 
Mixed -0.096 -0.098 -0.097 -0.097 -0.096 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** 
Asian 0.093 0.090 0.075 0.109 0.107 
 [0.025]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** 
Native -0.073 -0.039 -0.057 -0.062 -0.040 
 [0.031]** [0.037] [0.036] [0.034]* [0.035] 
Migrant 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.062 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of Schooling 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
College  0.464 0.516 0.519 0.511 0.512 
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Graduate School 0.926 0.991 0.986 0.950 0.980 
 [0.025]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]*** 
Federal 0.306 0.295 0.293 0.306 0.303 
 [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
State 0.057 0.049 0.052 0.049 0.048 
 [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Municipal -0.099 -0.134 -0.140 -0.123 -0.129 
 [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Seniority 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.110 -0.094 -0.094 -0.095 -0.092 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Service -0.040 -0.041 -0.040 -0.040 -0.039 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
Others 0.063 0.070 0.072 0.065 0.066 
 [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Urban 0.106 0.102 0.100 0.098 0.100 
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Constant -0.735 -0.858 -0.880 -0.784 -0.857 
 [0.038]*** [0.042]*** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** 
131 
 
 
Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
-0.456 -0.317 -0.311 -0.332 -0.330 
 [0.012]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Observations 174,762 143,530 140,627 151,705 146,992 
R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table C39: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ hourly wages using older females as a control group by 
child‘s age, Policy 2B only 
loghw 
Without 
children 
age≤1 
age >1 and 
age≤2 
age >2 and 
age≤6 
age >6 and 
age≤10 
Female20 to 40 0.059 0.107 0.065 -0.040 0.022 
 [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.020]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]* 
Policy1 0.190 0.142 0.144 0.074 0.145 
 [0.019]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** 
p1xfemale20to40 -0.030 -0.040 -0.046 0.061 -0.036 
 [0.017]* [0.014]*** [0.017]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
Age  0.014 0.026 0.011 0.025 0.001 
 [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.007] [0.004]*** [0.009] 
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]* [0.000]*** [0.000] 
Black -0.093 -0.135 -0.131 -0.130 -0.121 
 [0.013]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** 
Mixed -0.087 -0.111 -0.104 -0.110 -0.103 
 [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** 
Asian 0.092 0.050 0.029 0.086 0.084 
 [0.037]** [0.044] [0.045] [0.043]** [0.043]* 
Native -0.276 0.041 -0.004 -0.037 0.028 
 [0.055]*** [0.070] [0.064] [0.057] [0.057] 
Migrant 0.051 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.037 
 [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 
Years of Schooling 0.054 0.072 0.071 0.072 0.071 
 [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
College  0.422 0.441 0.434 0.448 0.435 
 [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
Graduate School 0.818 0.825 0.806 0.795 0.807 
 [0.036]*** [0.029]*** [0.030]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]*** 
Federal 0.376 0.464 0.470 0.472 0.473 
 [0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** 
State 0.060 -0.029 -0.028 -0.017 -0.020 
 [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]** [0.009]** 
Municipal -0.024 -0.059 -0.058 -0.054 -0.054 
 [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.008]*** [0.008]*** 
Seniority 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Commerce -0.169 -0.101 -0.097 -0.108 -0.087 
 [0.008]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** 
Service -0.045 -0.075 -0.077 -0.067 -0.059 
 [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** 
Others 0.031 -0.013 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 
 [0.008]*** [0.009] [0.009]* [0.008] [0.008] 
Urban 0.121 0.096 0.103 0.073 0.093 
 [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** 
Constant -0.182 -0.708 -0.302 -0.627 -0.090 
 [0.095]* [0.146]*** [0.200] [0.118]*** [0.228] 
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Inverse Mills 
Ratio 
-0.769 -0.057 -0.111 -0.041 -0.108 
 [0.077]*** [0.036] [0.041]*** [0.033] [0.038]*** 
Observations 43,882 41,684 38,781 49,859 45,146 
R-squared 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Employment Equation 
Table C40: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra à Domicilio: Effects of change in maternity 
leave policy on young females‘ employment, Policy 2B only 
Employed 
Control Group 
Young Males Older Females Young Males Older Females 
Private and Public Sectors Public Sector 
Female -0.272 - 0.079 - 
 [0.002]*** - [0.002]*** - 
policy2B -0.031 0.011 -0.052 -0.038 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.007]*** 
p2Bxfemale 0.031 - 0.001 - 
 [0.002]*** - [0.003] - 
female20to40 - -0.017 - -0.009 
 - [0.003]*** - [0.006] 
p2Bxfemale20to40 - -0.011 - -0.006 
 - [0.003]*** - [0.006] 
Age  0.035 0.046 0.006 0.032 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Black  0.016 0.073 0.014 0.038 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]*** 
Mixed  0.004 0.026 0.014 0.026 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** 
Asian  -0.075 -0.021 -0.033 -0.067 
 [0.012]*** [0.012]* [0.012]*** [0.019]*** 
Native  0.024 0.066 -0.006 -0.013 
 [0.015] [0.018]*** [0.020] [0.033] 
Migrant  0.008 0.002 -0.041 -0.082 
 [0.002]*** [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.004]*** 
Years of schooling 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.037 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
College 0.131 0.137 0.057 0.100 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** 
Graduate school 0.168 0.211 0.072 0.075 
 [0.011]*** [0.014]*** [0.013]*** [0.017]*** 
Urban  -0.042 0.000 -0.179 -0.331 
 [0.002]*** [0.003] [0.004]*** [0.006]*** 
Head of household  0.199 0.175 - -0.049 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** - [0.003]*** 
Number of children - -0.013 - 0.034 
 - [0.000]*** - [0.001]*** 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 603,433 503,216 258,873 139,769 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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